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# THE MONTH

VOL. CLXXXI

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## EDITORIAL COMMENTS

### Victory at Last

THE military operations of March and early April have brought certain victory to the Allies. The Germans have been fighting a series of losing campaigns for the past two years. Now these campaigns are lost—and lost irretrievably. Final victory has come in the West rather than the East of Europe, though the Russian military contribution has been immense. The Allied crossings of the Rhine will rank high in military history as indeed will the landings on the Normandy coast in June, 1944. The high strategy of the Western Allies has been most consistent and effective. These Western democracies, so despised by the German militarists, have beaten those militarists on their own chosen ground and with their own weapons. The tank and the bomber were to conquer Europe for Germany; the tank and bomber have played a massive part in Germany's defeat. Yet the great fact of Allied sea-power must not be forgotten, for this has been the chief basis of Allied strategy, as it has been the major reason for Allied victory. The first Rhine crossing, at Remagen, was a military piece of luck, due to the negligence of one side and the ingenuity of the other. But Field-Marshal Montgomery's crossings over the Lower Rhine were made in the face of powerful opposition. The subsequent advances, of Americans and British, were phenomenal. The whole area of the Ruhr was sealed off in little more than a week. Large towns, like Frankfort and Mannheim, were captured, and lesser centres such as Osnabrück and Cassel. To the South, American columns were racing through Würzburg towards Nuremberg and the Danube, cutting the German Reich in half, and bidding fair to link up with Russian armies forcing their way into the Danube valley at Vienna. When will hostilities cease? Firstly, with the break-up of the German *Wehrmacht*—a process well under weigh to the East of the Rhine. But perhaps not completely until the mountains of South-East Bavaria and Tyrol and Salzburg have been cleared of the Nazi forces who, according to very circumstantial accounts in Swiss newspapers, have turned those districts into a well-equipped and copiously-stocked fortress. It is clear that Germany is to be under military Government and Allied control. What is not yet clear is the full programme of that control, with its eventual plans for a federated Germany. The Continental Press is rich in surmises. Some Belgian papers have expressed their fear of a "proposed" Rhineland-Westphalian State,

which they consider will be too powerful. Elsewhere there is revival of talk—echoed by Sir A. Lambert Ward in the House of Commons—of the creation of a new South German State, comprising Austria, Bavaria and the former Duchies of Würtemberg and Baden. The Allied victory from the West has certainly enhanced the Anglo-American prestige and allows them now an even more important voice in the shaping of post-war Europe. It has also increased their responsibilities. They must see to it, that hostilities are brought to a close, that chaos gives way to at least a temporary order and security, that millions of prisoners and deported workers be repatriated, and that there be soon provided a decent modicum of civilian relief.

### Two Wars in Europe ?

**A** YEAR ago, Mr. Churchill gave it as his opinion that the war was losing its "ideological" character. It is of course debatable whether it had much ideological character to lose. Considerable mischief has been done by facile talk about the war against Nazism and against Fascism. The first of these expressions concealed the fact that we have been fighting against an embattled Germany, while the term "Fascism" is wildly used in propaganda to hurl abuse at individuals and countries which happen at the moment to be out of favour with the propagandist. It might be more satisfactory to divide the war in Europe into two distinct halves or, better still, into two distinct wars. The Western democracies are fighting in a joint partnership with Russia. All are Allied Powers and they have an enemy in common. But their motives and general ideas are very different as different is their vision of the shape of things to come. The struggle between those democracies and Germany is a political struggle—all wars are that—but it is shot through and illuminated by certain principles which they possess in common, the principle of the liberties of persons and of peoples, the principle of a reign of international law. The conflict between Russia and Germany is, much more frankly, on the political level. Not that the Russians lack their ideals and, if you like, their principles too. But these are different from those of the democracies. In the grim years of defensive resistance to German attack, these differences of motive and outlook were not so marked ; they did not matter then as they begin to matter now. With the approach of victory on the Continent, they are manifesting themselves with vigorous clarity.

### Russian Foreign Policy

**T**HE Catholic Press is frequently taken to task for its criticism of Russia's foreign policy. Yet, facts have to be faced. Otherwise, co-operation between the Western Powers and Russia may end in disillusionment, and we shall come to distrust the Russians all the more



because of our failure to understand their political aims. The Russians, we are informed continually, are stern realists ; this means that they have the habit of looking at the realities in any given situation. We can learn from them this measure, at the least, of political realism. For Russia's foreign policy is nothing if not consistent. True, there was a break or there appeared to be a break, in the continuity of that policy, under the direct influence of Lenin. Speaking on May 12th, 1917, to the All-Russian Conference of the Russian Social Democratic Labour Party (the reference to this and the following citation will be found, in a footnote, on page 117), Lenin asked :

Why should we, Great Russians, who have been oppressing a greater number of nations than any other people, why should we repudiate the right of separation for Poland, the Ukraine, Finland ?

If Finland, if Poland, if the Ukraine break away from Russia, it is nothing terrible. Why and in what is it bad ? Anyone who says so is a Chauvinist. One must be insane to continue the policy of Czar Nicholas. . . . There was a time when Alexander and Napoleon traded peoples, there was a time when the Czars were trading portions of Poland. Are we to continue this policy of the Czars ? . . . That would be Chauvinism of the worst sort.

No people can be free which oppresses another people.

A little more than a year afterwards, on August 29th, 1918, a decree of the Council of People's Commissars contained this paragraph as its third article :

All treaties and acts concluded by the Government of the former Russian Empire with the Governments of the Kingdom of Prussia and the Austro-Hungarian Empire, concerning the partitions of Poland, in view of their being contrary to the principle of the self-determination of nations and the revolutionary sense of law of the Russian nation, which recognizes the Polish Nation's inalienable right to independence and unity, are hereby repealed irrevocably.

This ideology of Lenin has now disappeared to make way for an older and traditional policy. The Soviet Government to-day is heir to the aspirations of Peter the Great, descending through the Empress Catherine II and the various Czars Alexander and Nicholas of the nineteenth century. It is the policy of expansion in certain well-defined directions, and I am speaking of it now as purely Russian national policy, and not as it may be complicated by the fact that Russia to-day is Communist. There are indications that this policy was already exerting its influence before 1939. In the Commons' debate on the Polish amendment, on February 28th, Sir Archibald Southby put the following question which received no satisfactory answer :

Mr. Neville Chamberlain has been bitterly criticized because he failed to come to an agreement with Russia in 1939—the suggestion being that had he done so this war would not have taken place. Is

it or is it not a fact that we could have had a treaty with Russia in 1939 had we been prepared to agree to a demand by Russia that she should have Eastern Poland up to the so-called Curzon Line, the three Baltic republics, and certain bases in Finnish territory, and that because we, to the lasting honour of the late Mr. Neville Chamberlain, refused an agreement based on such an arrangement, Russia then entered into the Ribbentrop-Molotov Agreement with Germany, by which she did in fact secure just those things?

There is little doubt that the Moscow Pact of August, 1939, did satisfy Russia's claims to expansion in these particular areas.

### Traditional Policy

**R**ETURNING to this traditional foreign policy of Russia, its first objective is the Baltic. An outlet to the Baltic, that was the clear aim of Peter the Great; hence his wars with Sweden, then an important Continental Power, in possession of Baltic coastal lands. Here strategic considerations have much more reality than in Poland. Leningrad was threatened through the Baltic States as Russian security was never menaced across Poland. This gives the reason for Russia's re-annexation of the three Baltic countries, Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia, first of all in 1940, and then again in 1944 and 1945. *The Bulletin of International News*, for November 25th, 1944, had a detailed account of events in these States.

Their policy—it stated—since 1921 was consistently based on the principle of not giving offence, or a pretext for interference, to either of their great neighbours. They realized that, but for the defeat of Germany in 1918, they might have been incorporated into the German Reich, and that, following the German defeat, they had only narrowly escaped absorption into the Soviet Union during the Bolshevik Revolution. They were constantly haunted by the fear of again becoming a battle-ground for Russo-German rivalry or, alternatively, being partitioned if the two Powers became too friendly.

In other words, such small countries situated between powerful neighbours could expect survival, only when there was a balance of power between those neighbours. When that balance became disturbed either through rapprochement between these neighbours, as under the Moscow Pact in 1939, or through hostility, as in 1941 and since, they were doomed. This is the sad fate of small countries when larger States act purely on the level of Power-politics, ignoring the rights of peoples and putting aside international law. The Moscow Pact, as has been said, brought about a temporary rapprochement between Russia and Germany. "As part of the price Hitler was obliged to pay Stalin for Russia's neutrality during his attack on the West was the control of the Baltic States." In September and October, 1939, Mutual Assistance Pacts were concluded between these countries and Russia, which gave Russia the right to establish naval and air bases on their territories. "All three Pacts referred to Russia's con-

tinued respect for the independence of the States in their internal affairs, and insisted that they were aimed essentially at the protection of the three States against outside aggression." These agreements secured, for Russia, the effective control, both military and naval, of the Baltic coast between Prussia and the Gulf of Finland, and "transformed the Baltic Republics virtually into Russian protectorates." In 1940, steps were taken to gain more complete control. The Russians complained that these countries had failed to carry out their agreements, had plotted together against the U.S.S.R., and ill-treated Russian soldiers. They demanded the admission of further Soviet troops and the replacement of the existing Governments by new administrations more favourable to Moscow. The three countries held "free" elections on June 14th and 15th, "in which voting was compulsory, and only such candidates as were acceptable to the Communists were allowed to be nominated." The new assemblies met on July 21st, when they passed resolutions, asking that the countries might be incorporated in the Soviet Union. So were absorbed three small States; thus did Russia re-extend her dominion along the shores of the Baltic. The invasion of Finland was part of this policy, and it was followed in 1941 by a second Russo-Finnish war. However, since the armistice between Finland and Russia, the Russian Government has exercised commendable restraint. The peace terms were severe enough; but the Russians in Finland have behaved with noticeable correctitude, and elections have been normally held.

#### **From North West to South West**

**T**HE second important direction of traditional Russian policy was towards the South West, that is, towards the mouths of the river Danube and the Straits. Hence, the frequent Russian clashes with Turkey; hence too the Crimean War. Just as Russia desired an outlet to the Baltic and subsequently control of the Baltic, so also she sought predominance in the Black Sea, with an outlet into the Mediterranean. Throughout the nineteenth century, it was the policy of many European Powers, among them Britain and Germany, to check Russian designs in this area. Consequently, in 1856, after the conclusion of the Crimean War, a European Commission was established to administer the Danube from the town of Braila to the Black Sea; its position was again confirmed at the Congress of Berlin, in 1878. This Commission was international and, at the outbreak of war, it included representatives from Britain, France, Italy and Roumania; the Russian member was withdrawn in 1917, and Germany was to send a representative in 1939. In September, 1940, a conference took place at Bucharest between Russia and the Axis Powers on the subject of Danubian administration. Germany was interested mainly in the Upper and Middle Danube, Russia in the Lower Danube where it joins the Black Sea. In a previous interview

with the German Ambassador, Count Schulenburg, Molotov had declared that the European Commission dated from a period of Russian weakness when she had been exhausted by the Crimean War, and that Russia was anxious to make fresh and more favourable arrangements for the control of the river. The Bucharest conference ended indecisively, for the Axis countries were afraid of the Russian suggestion that the administration of the lower Danube should be left to Roumania and herself. The Russian position was greatly strengthened by the annexation of Bessarabia, first in 1940, and then in 1944, after the capitulation of Roumania. It is safe to prophesy that Russian influence on the Lower Danube and in the Black Sea will be far more marked now. With the Russian interest in Danube and Black Sea went a similar interest in the Straits and in Constantinople. For reasons that were religious as well as political, the Russians hoped to occupy Constantinople. Religiously, this would mean the possession of what they termed the Second Rome, as Moscow in their eyes was the Third Rome. Politically, it would have given them a clear passage from the Black Sea into the Mediterranean. The news that the Russian Government wishes to have its treaty arrangements with Turkey reconsidered and altered to the Russian advantage is a hint that its interest in this problem is at least as vivid as ever. A third area of Russian traditional interest is the Balkan peninsula. Here Russian interests clashed with those of the Turks, and later, with those of Austria-Hungary and Germany. The Russian line of activity ran North and South; that of Germany, with Austria-Hungary, was running East. In the Balkans those lines crossed, and there, to a very real extent, you had the origin of the war of 1914. To-day Russian influence is paramount in the Balkans.

### Westwards into Europe

**T**HE third direction of Russian traditional policy, for the past two hundred years, has been Westwards into Europe. And here is the origin of the Polish problem. The growth during the eighteenth century of strong centralized States, to either side of the far more loosely structured kingdom of the Poles, resulted in the three partitions, of 1772, 1793 and 1795, and in the century and a quarter of Polish submergence under three alien Governments. That the partitions of Poland were a crime is everywhere acknowledged, and the national patience and courage of the Poles have been an inspiration to all free men. The thirteenth of the fourteen points of President Wilson, stating that there must be a free and independent Poland, was hailed as a charter of much belated justice; indeed, the consciences of all three partitioning Powers had been sufficiently stirred during the 1914-18 war to make them issue declarations of autonomy for Poland, should they prevail. An article, later in this number, deals with the decisions of the Crimea Conference, and in particular with its handing



over of Poland's Eastern provinces to Russia. The more we reflect upon this decision, the more iniquitous it appears. Morally, the whole decision is an enormity. It is contrary to the guarantees which we gave to the Poles in 1939. After all, we guaranteed Poland, as it was—not as Foreign Office specialists might have imagined it in 1920, or as M. Molotov would prefer it in 1945. It is contrary to the many intimate human obligations we have contracted through more than five years of co-operation with Poles, fighting with us and for us on land, sea, and in the air. It involves the repudiation of four solemn treaty agreements mutually signed by the Governments of Russia and Poland; it runs counter to one explicit article in the Anglo-Russian Treaty of 1941. It was decided in a most arbitrary manner—against both the spirit and the letter of the Atlantic Charter, that symbol of the hopes we once entertained, and in defiance of the normal procedures of international law. The decision was made without any consultation of the one and only legitimate Polish Government or of the 12 to 13 million inhabitants of those provinces of Eastern Poland. Frontier rectification is always a problem. Many frontiers will require adjustment after the war. Why was the Russo-Polish frontier not allowed to await such post-war revision. Poland, let us remember—it is not so obvious from the way in which some organs of the British Press have spoken about that country—is one of the victorious allies, and no defeated enemy. Yes, and not merely one ally, but that ally, which, conscious of all it meant, took the full impact of German attack. It is idle and dishonest to speak about the handing over of half of Polish territory and more than a third of the Polish population as just "frontier rectification"; frontiers are not shifted with that rapidity. And it is equally idle not to recognize that millions in Britain and the United States have been seriously disturbed by this Crimea decision. These millions want the war to be won; they are anxious that some post-war organization should come into being to deal with potential causes of conflict and to secure for the peoples of the world a just and honourable peace. President Roosevelt's comment was that the decision on Poland was a compromise and that he did "not agree with all of it, by any means." Mr. Churchill did his best to defend the decision on the ground of justice. But it was noticeable that the Prime Minister's supporters in the Yalta debate abandoned this difficult terrain and spoke of the decision as an agreement on the plane of force, of Power-politics. It was a concession, presumably an inevitable concession, to Russian foreign policy, a concession, necessary, however it might be deplored, in order to secure unity and co-operation between the major Allies for victory in the Continental war and for the establishment of a post-war organization for world peace. Yet, when we are tempted to compare this attitude with the moral idealism, so marked in Britain in 1940 and 1941, we are conscious of a sad decline. Then we were vividly aware of moral and spiritual issues. Now the weight



of Power-politics drags us downwards. The only serious defence of the Yalta paragraphs on Poland is that they are "inevitable on the plane of practical politics." Yes, but so was our appeasement of Germany, at Munich, in 1938; and, in the spirit of 1940 and 1941, we came to condemn that appeasement. What have we to think of this larger appeasement of 1945?

### The Crimea Document

THE joint Yalta document will play an important part at San Francisco. Its sections which deal with military action against Germany and the treatment of defeated Germany are reasonably clear. Parts V and VI, however, which are concerned with "Liberated Europe" and with Poland present several ambiguities. At the beginning of part V the Yalta Powers state that they will concert measures to meet "the political and economic problems of liberated Europe in accordance with democratic principles," and that they "have consulted with each other in the common interests of the peoples of their countries and those of liberated Europe." Strange, perhaps, that in a declaration on liberated Europe it is the peoples of the major Allies who have to be considered first of all. The document continues with the expressed intention of assisting the liberated and the formerly satellite peoples "to solve by democratic means their pressing political and economic problems"; these freed peoples are "to create democratic institutions of their own choice." Here follows a reference to the Atlantic Charter:

This is a principle of the Atlantic Charter—the right of all peoples to choose the form of government under which they will live—the restoration of sovereign rights and self-government to those peoples who have been forcibly deprived of them by the aggressor nations.

What will a Pole of Lwów or Wilno, or a Lithuanian or Latvian think of this otherwise admirable sentiment? And who, finally, are aggressor nations? The document proceeds to speak of interim Governments that will be *broadly representative of all democratic elements in the population*. But how, in effect, is this principle being put into practice to-day, in different European countries? Genuinely, as in Finland, where the March elections were held in an atmosphere of liberty and fairness: outrageously, as in Bulgaria, where the existing Government, a curious blend of military men and Left-wing extremists, has been busy—through the judicial processes of People's Courts—murdering practically all members of the two previous Governments, the heads of other political parties, and prominent Bulgarian citizens who might become political opponents: cynically, as in Yugoslavia, where there is one-Party rule, and in Roumania whose Government under M. Groza has excluded the two most important Roumanian parties, the Liberals and the Peasant Party of M. Maniu. The Yalta document continues with a second appeal to the Atlantic Charter:

By this declaration we reaffirm our faith in the principles of the Atlantic Charter, our pledge in the declaration by the United Nations, and our determination to build in co-operation, with other peace-loving nations, a world order under law, dedicated to peace, security, freedom and the general well-being of mankind.

Again, a generous sentiment which is almost universally shared and responds to the insistent desire of the peoples of the world for a secure and abiding peace. But the realist at once objects—and these days we are often exhorted to be realists—that this feeling is scarcely well exemplified in the next section, No. VI, which treats of Poland ; nor, of course, is there mention of the Baltic States. Section VI is not an encouraging “ trailer ” from this new “ world order under law ” which we are promised. A serious ambiguity underlies the expression “ democracy.” For the Russians, when they employ it, mean an egalitarian State, under rigid administrative and Party control, in which the well-being of the people is provided or at least intended, but which allows of no political opposition, and no political democracy in the Western interpretation of that word. A Lublin Government might be democratic, in the Russian sense ; it could never be that, as we understand the word. This different interpretation of the expression “ democracy ” is brought home by an article in the Yugoslav paper *Borba*, of March 17th. The article has the title “ Some Characteristics of the democratic Government of Yugoslavia ” and is a reply to accusations in the American Press that there exists a one-Party State in Yugoslavia. This the article is not concerned to deny but only to show that it is democratic. It asserts that the political outlook of the people of Yugoslavia has been changed radically through the war, and that Yugoslavs can no longer be grouped according to pre-war political and party standards. The article concludes :

The essence of democracy consists primarily in the Government of the country by the wide masses of the people, in these masses being given the full possibility of using their democratic rights, and in the existence of *complete concordance between State policy and the vital interests of the masses*. In our National Liberation struggle we have, in the battle for the new Yugoslavia, created an unshakable unity of the masses.

The “ vital interests of the masses ” are, of course, interpreted by one Party and one Party only. Political opposition, as Western democracy understands it, is ruled out. There is one-Party control, a control of thought and speech by an orthodox Party line, a rigid Party and State control of people and resources.

The same point is driven home in a speech of M. Vyshinsky, Soviet Vice-Commissar for Foreign Affairs, who was sent to Roumania to establish the Government of M. Groza. Speaking on March 9th, at Bucharest, Vyshinsky said :

It would be a mistake to think that this change occurred without *certain forces hostile to democracy* attempting an opposition. The main rôle in this opposition was played by *the so-called historical parties*, or,

it would be more to the point if we called them *archaic parties*, or, even better, *parties belonging to the archives*. As was known, Premier Groza had invited representatives of these parties to enter the Government—not under the same conditions as those under which they had participated in the Radescu and Sanatescu Governments, when the historical parties held all the principal posts of State leadership, but under more modest conditions equivalent to the modest place they occupied in society and in the State. But they rejected this suggestion and retired into splendid isolation. Roumanian democracy was victorious. For the consolidation and solidarity of those democratic forces which led the country to this achievement, there is but one solution: not to be misled by discussions about democracy. Such discussions have now become very frequent. Pseudo-democrats are most dangerous.

The meaning of Vyshinsky's address is perfectly clear. What we understand as "democratic parties" are to be ruled out as having lost their significance. When they are removed, then is democracy "victorious." Genuine democrats, in our sense, are "pseudo-democrats" in Russian eyes. What then, it must be asked, is the value of the many references to "democracy" in the report from Yalta?

Finally, in section VI of the Yalta report, considerable ambiguity is detected when we compare the explicit statements of Mr. Eden in the House of Commons with the actual text of the document. The Foreign Secretary has said categorically that Britain does not consider the Lublin Government to be at all representative and does not, and never will, recognize it. Yet the document has three explicit references to this Lublin administration. It is "the present Provisional Government which is now functioning in Poland" that is to be reorganized; the Commission of three in Moscow is to consult "with members of the present Provisional Government"; and the U.S.S.R. is spoken of as maintaining diplomatic relations "with the present Provisional Government of Poland." The Polish Government in London is never once mentioned and is sedulously kept out of the declaration. Herein lies real ambiguity. The one and only hope is that honest diplomacy will resolve this contradiction.

### The Road to San Francisco

NO one can do anything but wish well to the San Francisco Conference, the object of which is to outline a framework of world-order and world-security. It has behind it, on the political side, the results of Dumbarton Oaks and Yalta and, on the economic, various other achievements, e.g. of Bretton Woods, and the experiments of Lease-Lend. It is obvious that the three major Allies will have the chief decisions to make, as it must be their chief responsibility to safeguard world-peace when this war is over. Collaboration between these Powers is essential. Yet, there is the danger that the new world-order may be little more than a camouflaged Grand Alliance, with these major Powers controlling the world in their own way and, inevitably, in their own common interests; and, be it remembered,

common interests easily grow less common and diverge. The main criticism of the League of Nations was that it was not sufficiently high-powered. The new world-order may remedy this deficiency at the expense of principles and ideals. The League of Nations was again criticized for having made insufficient distinction between greater and smaller States. There is now a danger lest the new world-order place all its emphasis on this distinction, and that the smaller countries be left with the choice of attaching themselves to one or other of the larger Powers or of having no significance at all. The League of Nations certainly suffered by being closely associated with a particular historical situation, that of the Peace Treaties of Versailles. San Francisco is subject to a similar temptation. The conference is not a World Conference, but a meeting of the United Nations, and a state of war with the Axis was a necessary passport to membership of the conference. Turkey and Egypt qualified for admission at the last moment. Other countries that have remained neutral are not represented. Yet, it is curious that countries which are not only peace-loving but have actually succeeded in keeping the peace should not be allowed representation. What is most problematic about this important meeting is the uncertainty about, if not the absence of, an agreed basis of moral principles and the realization that no world organization can be properly erected except on such an agreed foundation of stable law and principle. No one can afford to be blind to the actual difficulties. The Russian outlook is very far removed from that of Britain and the U.S.A., as it is remote from the standpoints of the smaller European and American States. But equally, no one must be blind to the imperative need of this basis of common principles, which ought to provide a guarantee of freedom and security for individuals and for the smaller nations. In this sublunary world, Power is essential to safeguard Right and Justice. But, unless this be acknowledged to be the only legitimate function of Power, unless those who have and wield the power are agreed that it shall be employed only in the cause of Justice and Right, and have also a reasonably clear and commonly-accepted notion of what constitutes that Right and Justice, then prospects for future peace and world-order are very chequered indeed. More recent news, e.g., that M. Molotov, the Russian Foreign Minister, is not to attend the San Francisco Conference, and the farcical pretence of Russia backing the "spontaneous" demand of the Lublin Government to be invited as representative of Poland, makes it more doubtful than ever whether Russia and the West can build together an organization for world peace.

### The Frightful Spectre

ONE very urgent reason for bringing the European war to an end as soon as possible is the frightening spectre of famine which already ranges far and wide across the Continent. The lot of countries,



occupied by the Germans, was no happy one, economically. For most of them, liberation, while it has restored liberty and hope, has worsened the economic situation. This was not unexpected; what is deplorable is that it has lasted so long. In liberated Italy conditions are very alarming. Of course, Southern and Central Italy are far less productive, in agriculture as well as in industry, than the North. Still, twenty months have passed since the Allies landed in Italy, and the position is acute, food is scarce and poor, a black market flourishes. One report stated recently that the Italians to-day may be divided into honest and dishonest thieves, that is into those who get hold of food somehow for personal and family requirements, and those who do the same for financial profit. Relief work has been delayed for want of transport because of the needs of the war in Europe and the speeding up of operations in the Far East. The plight of the French, in many provinces, is nearly as bad. Here transport is the major difficulty; in many places transport and fuel are non-existent. Reports from France speak of large public *meetings de la faim*—one was attended by 50,000 in Paris, another in Lyons by 100,000—which made strong demands that the Government should ruthlessly take over all food distribution. Yugoslavia and Poland are suffering just as seriously. Add to this the shortage of medical and health requisites, much of this looted by the Germans, some of it requisitioned by the Russians in the Eastern campaigns. A large proportion of the population of Europe is under-nourished; millions are on the verge of starvation; tens of thousands have actually died from starvation. Should the present situation continue, or grow worse, there is a real danger of widespread famine, with lasting consequences even for the survivors and little hope for the growing generation. The most important aim for international conferences, at the moment, is to take measures to deal with this frightful problem, to provide relief—food, clothing, medical equipment—for the Continent. Recent Commons' debates on Housing have shown how difficult will be the provision of sufficient houses and adequate housing conditions in Britain during the post-war years. The problem, difficult enough here, will be doubly and trebly serious abroad. The air bombardment of Germany, the advance of Allied armies across Germany from West and East, have brought about such material havoc that it will not be possible for people in Germany to lead a "civilized" life, on the material plane. Much of the material damage of war is unavoidable; the problems raised by such military necessities have to be faced and, eventually, to be resolved.

### This Overdose of Politics

**M**AN is a "political" animal as well as a "social" animal. The tragedy is that the political side of life can be and has been emphasized to the detriment of everything else. Especially have totalitarian States elected politics into a religious faith. Youth has been marshalled and dragooned; made to express itself in parrot



cries and automatic gestures with fist and arm. Bewildered, bemused, finally hypnotized, men have become "robots," whose reactions can be controlled and conditioned, whose individuality has been sucked out of them. This process of "robotization" has released great stores of energy for political and military purposes, but under it the unfortunate human being has suffered. Everywhere men want to be rid of this political incubus and to devote their attention to more normal human activities. What fanatical "faiths" these symbols and emblems have aroused—the crooked cross, the hammer and sickle, the partisan star? Nor is this phenomenon confined to such States. In the democracies, too, political differences have been sharpened and envenomed. One of the major causes of France's weakness in 1940 was just the fact that politics had divided the people of France so violently that national union, in the face of danger, was slow to be achieved. The development of the war has favoured small and determined political groups; frequently they have directed resistance movements, partly against the common enemy, but in part also to gain political control after the war. Examples are not far to seek, e.g. in Greece and Yugoslavia. Nearer home, we discover a handy system of labels that Left-wing adherents stick to their opponents. Criticise Russia, and you are dubbed a "Fascist" or even, in the more realistic papers, "a Fascist international brigand." Mention the idea of Conservatism, and you are a "reactionary." Yet what is painfully required on the Continent is a truce to these violent political attitudes which outlaw men who will not accept them uncritically. Writing in the Italian paper, *Risorgimento Liberale*, in March, Benedetto Croce urged the formation in Italy of a Conservative Party but pointed out that truly Conservative elements were afraid of coming forward for fear of being branded as Fascists.

It is not our intention—he wrote—to deny that Conservative currents are not to be found among Italian citizens; but it is apparent that they have no possibility of forming a Party or they lack the courage to do so. I say courage, because we have to admit that material and spiritual interests which have the right to defend themselves and to be heard in the political arena are bound up in these currents; but even if they could do no more, they could serve at least as a brake on reforms of too precipitous or radical a nature. Looked at in this way, it would be desirable that those who feel and think like this should have the courage either to speak out and oppose or come to an understanding with the men belonging to the different Parties in the framework of the liberal State.

Shortly before he left for Rome to take up his new post as French Ambassador to the Vatican, M. Jacques Maritain pleaded for a new Conservative Party in France, including even "the impenitent victims of the myth of the Marshal," which "would furnish them with new leaders and enable them to express openly their political opinions"; this, he claimed, was necessary if there is to be a properly balanced democratic France.

### The French Position

GENERAL DE GAULLE'S Government has had considerable success in both its domestic and foreign policies. Both are founded on a balance, in the one case, between the more conservative and the resistance forces, in the other, between Russia and the Western democracies. At home, the Government is criticized for not adopting more thorough measures of public control and for employing officials of the Vichy régime. In spite of severe economic difficulties, it enjoys authority. Political parties are striving for mutual understanding, and the official Party line of the Communists is one of support for the régime, though the Communists, as would be expected, have dutifully criticized the French Government's refusal to sponsor the invitations of the Great Powers to the conference of San Francisco. In foreign relations, France has concluded an alliance with Russia. This move both conciliated Left-wing elements at home and revived the older French concept of security against Germany through a Russian treaty. There is as yet no corresponding treaty with Great Britain. France is suspicious of British policy in the Near East and fears that the British encouragement of an Arab Federation may, in effect, undermine French prestige and the position of France in Syria. The French are also distrustful of possible American plans in Arab lands, and generally they have been made highly sensitive by American military successes. However much they have welcomed liberation, mainly at the hands of the U.S.A., it is a blow that American troops should have crossed the Rhine while the armies of France are more or less impotent. It is a symbol of the decline of *la patrie*. Returning to the international situation, France is toying with the notion of taking the leadership of the smaller countries at San Francisco. One paper, *Franc-Tireur*, puts the alternative: "Vaut-il mieux être le premier à Bruxelles, à Bucharest, à San Marin . . . ou le quatrième à San Francisco?" *Franc-Tireur* favours the second alternative, and France has a strong bargaining position if she shoulders the claims of smaller nations and insists that representatives have been summoned to the Western coast of the U.S.A. to discuss, and not merely to sign on the proverbial dotted line. *Franc-Tireur* is a Resistance paper. Another Resistance journal, *Libération*, stated, in March, that the French people do not consider the proposals made at Dumbarton Oaks sufficiently realistic to guarantee world peace. *Libération* continued:

The text of the invitation to be sent to the participating nations was drawn up at Yalta. The French Government had interpreted it as implying a tacit acceptance of the Dumbarton Oaks plan. As she wished to bring important changes to this plan, France could not accept the text. In London, Mr. Eden had assured M. Bidault that Britain intended to suggest amendments to this plan and did not consider herself in any way bound by the wording of the invitation. Thus the same right remained open to France. This was the reason why,

on M. Bidault's return, the Council of Ministers decided to accept the principle. However, the French declaration expressing this acceptance gave details regarding the already mentioned reservation and asked for some modification in the wording of the invitations. The U.S.A., Britain and China accepted this request, but it would appear that the U.S.S.R. refused it.

### A Lenten Appeal of the French Hierarchy

**D**URING Lent, the Cardinals and Bishops of France issued a comprehensive appeal that was, at the same time, a very comprehensive programme. It begins with a heartfelt demand for national unity and reconciliation. "To-day we wish to define the conditions of the *rassemblement* of all Frenchmen and to outline the principles which dominate the essential problems of the present moment. The inspiration and object of these principles are strictly moral and spiritual ; they aim only at achieving a state of justice, of moral health, of liberty and human progress ; they are foreign to all Party policies." The document is lengthy. Here is a summary :

(i) A fraternal union between all Frenchmen is now possible. All have their love for France ; all have suffered ; all are resolved to work for the recovery of their nation. Denunciation, suspicion, and vengeance must be set aside. The State may judge those whose deliberate treachery is solidly established. Otherwise, the past should inter its own dead.

(ii) The authority of the State must be respected. This involves obedience to the Provisional Government of de Gaulle.

The document then warns Frenchmen that justice is to be administered by the State and by no other groups. Justice must be prompt, with no unofficial arrests and no imprisonments without charge or crime. Justice should be true. Justice ought to be humane. Only in this way will be secured "a system of justice which is truly French." The bishops next turn to the relations between the Church and secular society. The summary continues :

(iii). The Church hopes that religious conflicts may be settled. "The State can count on the disinterested support of the Church for a loyal collaboration in the service of the community ; a co-operation which will be carried out outside and above all political parties solely through the normal interplay of the spiritual means which are her own. She only demands of the State that her independence be respected and that she be given the possibility of carrying out effectively her whole spiritual and social mission. The State will be the first to benefit from this co-operation of the Church."

(iv). The bishops declare that Catholics should play their part in all social and political activity.

(v). They ask for an equitable solution of the problem of education. "We ardently hope that a complete understanding may exist between all, both priests and teachers, who are called to the high mission of

forming the spirit of the children of France. Too long have those entrusted with education been opposed—to the disregard of charity and often of justice—when they should have been united by their common devotion to the same task. We ask that the freedom of religious instruction, inscribed in Republican law, be effectively assured, as it already is in all other democratic countries.” This liberty is claimed in the name of parents and of family rights, in language that recalls recent Catholic argument in Britain. “Parents bear the chief responsibility for their children’s upbringing; they have the inalienable right to choose, free from all pressure, the school where their children can receive both mental and moral training, which are inseparable from one another. This freedom of education, however, must not be the privilege of money; it must be granted to all, including the working-class families. We do not, therefore, see why parents should be forced to pay a double contribution merely because they may wish to carry out their Christian and Catholic duty.” “We demand this in the name of the rights of the human individual and of his essential liberties. For the liberty of education is only the natural corollary of the freedom of conscience and thought,”

(vi). The bishops then consider social problems. “Together with the Popes, we demand the *establishment of a new social order*, which, founded on the law of God, respects the essential dignity of the individual and gives to the family an essential place in the community which is due to it as an institution and natural society having its own fundamental purpose.” From this general announcement follow certain specific proposals. The first is that every worker should be given access to private property, through the establishment of a just wage and proper living conditions which will “enable him to develop his personality and bring up his family in a healthy home, corresponding to his requirements.” The second is a demand for the progressive sharing by the workers in the organization of labour and of their own firms and factories.

(vii). Then comes a recognition of the need for structural reform. This is advocated, with due regard for rights, along corporate lines. Efforts should be made “to weld the various elements of the same profession, employers, administrative officials and workers into human communities established in order, justice and brotherly love. At the basis of this professional organization, which through the *Comités d’Entreprise* and the *Commissions Mixtes* must fix the principles of permanent contact between all who belong to the community of labour, the Church has always affirmed and recognized the necessity of professional organizations. In this sphere also the liberty which respects all trends of thought and the pluralism of groups must win the day over the monopoly of the single union (*syndicalisme unique*) which inevitably becomes totalitarian.” The bishops remind Catholics that their natural adherence is to the Christian Trade Unions, which “take their inspiration from the Catholic ethic and the social doctrine of the Church.”

This is a comprehensive appeal and programme, which has been received with understanding even among French political parties far removed from Christian and Catholic ideals.



## DUMBARTON HOAX?

"What is decisive is that any promise which these statesmen make to a people is completely immaterial to-day, because they are no longer in a position ever to implement such an assurance. It is as if one sheep were to assure another sheep of its protection against a tiger." (Adolf Hitler, 30th January, 1945.)

THERE is by now a body of Allied declarations, and of Allied actions in the light of them, on which some sort of estimate can be made of the prospects for real international order after this war. The year 1941 gave us the Atlantic Charter (August 14th), and the Soviet adhesion to it (September 23rd). The next year gave us the United Nations' Declaration (New Year's Day). The year 1943 added two further statements: those of the Moscow Conference of the Big Four (October 30th) and the Teheran Conference of the Big Three (December 1st). Last year gave us Dumbarton Oaks, the text of its results released on October 9th. This year has given us so far the Black Sea Conference of the Big Three early in February. And in the meantime the military situation has progressed so inexorably that the London *Sunday Times* described the Crimea decisions, in advance, as "the *de facto* Peace Conference" (Feb. 11th).

There is no longer any doubt that the framework of the United Nations' New Order is the Dumbarton Oaks protocol. It is therefore well worth while to submit that protocol to dispassionate examination, against the background of "last time" and the lessons of the past.

### I

The international era that finally collapsed in 1939 had been built on four main foundations. These were: the sovereign equality of all States—members of the League of Nations; the principle of third-party judgment in disputes, enshrined in the Permanent Court of International Justice; the pledge of progressive disarmament; and the trusteeship of the Great Powers for backward nations and areas.<sup>1</sup> On those four legs the chair of international life was to stand firm, and for ten years it did indeed appear to do so. No critic impugned those foundations, as foundations, at the time: nor since. For the world at large, they had the commendation of all the statesmen who went year after year to Geneva. For Catholics, they had not only the commendation of Popes Benedict XV and Pius XI, but were repeated by Pius XII in his first Christmas Allocution.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> *League Covenant*, Cmd. 151, respectively arts. 1; 10-16; 8; 22.

<sup>2</sup> Benedict XV, *Pacem Dei Munus*, 23 May, 1920; Pius XI, *Ubi Arcano Dei*, 23 December, 1922; Pius XII, *In Questo Giorno*, 24 Dec., 1939.



None the less they foundered, and foundered inevitably. For two reasons above all others. They were at best *machinery* only; and on every occasion when obedience to principle ran counter to self-interest they were betrayed.

This point about machinery, indeed, gives the famous Peace Points of the present Pope their enduring practical value. The first four of his Points—on the rights of nations, the need for disarmament, the need for an international tribunal, and the principle of trusteeship for minorities—are identical with the four legs of the international chair that had collapsed. What makes all the difference is Point Five, the insistence on the need, among rulers and peoples equally, of “that hunger and thirst after justice which is proclaimed as a beatitude . . . and which supposes as its natural foundation the moral virtue of justice; they must be guided by that universal love which is the compendium and most general expression of the Christian ideal, and which, therefore, may serve as a common ground also for those who have not the blessing of sharing the same faith with us.” What this implies in practice is *at least* the imperative necessity for writing into the framework of the New World Order the *agreed moral principles* on which loyalty to it shall depend, and then formulating the rights and duties of the associated States *in terms* of those principles. That has never yet been done, though it has been urged.<sup>1</sup> And the lack of it—the lack of attention to motive as well as machinery—is still only too apparent in the blueprints of statesmen to-day. The remark of Mr. Sumner Welles that “only an international organization with armed force at its disposal, *and the willingness to use it*, could have successfully controlled the rising danger,” is a true epitaph on the League experiment. But in so far as it is the only sentence on this question of the will, and what actuates the will, in a book of 430 pages, it may well be an epitaph on the New World Order we are building to-day.<sup>2</sup>

The other reason for the failure—the betrayals—when the narrow national interest conflicted with the pledges given in the Covenant—leaves hardly a single reputation intact. The United States’ abandonment of the League at the outset; the French entry into the Ruhr in 1923; the side-tracking of the League by the Conference of Allied Ambassadors during the first three years; the secret rearmament of Germany even before the Hitler era of broken faith; the seizure by Japan of her Mandates when she left the League in 1935; the Polish denunciation of the Minority Treaties in 1934; the Italian perfidy in Ethiopia and Albania in 1935-9; the 1935 Anglo-German Navy Treaty behind the backs of the other Powers: all these have been denounced as international crimes. The party guilty of them has in each case pleaded as justification a “higher law,” standing above that

<sup>1</sup> See the argument in e.g. Douglas Jerrold, *The Necessity of Freedom*, London, 1938, ch. xi.

<sup>2</sup> Sumner Welles, *The Time for Decision*, New York and London, 1944, p. 341.

of "mere legalism." But, for all that, the World Court was never allowed an Equity jurisdiction to cover such cases of equity *versus* statute law. In so far as the argument of moral justification is sound, it only strengthens the case for setting out clearly in the Preamble to the new Covenant the moral principles which the international community is supposed to be serving. That is the only way of avoiding *certain* shipwreck in the future.<sup>1</sup>

## II

It will be said, of course, that moral rectitude, involving on occasion definite loss, *was* discernible in the Geneva years. It was indeed. There are few brighter chapters in the history of that era than the fidelity with which the British Government reported on its stewardship in Palestine when called on by the League Assembly year after year. Similarly the British offer of the port of Zeila as a means of averting the Italian Abyssinian invasion. But cases like this last came late; well after the dry rot had set in and the level of morality had fallen and the international climate become unhealthy. Let us not forget the jaundiced outlook with which, on the outbreak of this war, we were saying that the international outlook at the end of it would be retarded fifteen hundred years: that the international "sense" would emerge brutalized and primitive, as a result of what the Totalitarianisms had been able to do to the conscience of even decent nations.

It will also be said, on the other hand, that we now *have* this desired statement of moral principles with which to underpin the arrangements made after the war—in the Atlantic Charter. How far is that claim true?

The Atlantic Charter contains eight clauses.<sup>2</sup> The first clause forswears territorial ambitions. The second makes territorial changes depend on the wishes of the inhabitants concerned. The third enshrines the principle of free choice of forms of government. The fourth proclaims free and open access, for all, to the sources of raw materials. The fifth aspires to economic collaboration for social security. The sixth aspires to universal freedom from fear and want. The seventh proclaims the freedom of the seas. The last clause denounces the use of force unilaterally and calls for disarmament. All eight were subscribed to by the 33 United Nations on January 1st, 1942.

By now this Charter has a history. So far as our own country is concerned, its career has been as follows. Its original proclamation by Mr. Roosevelt and Mr. Churchill was as "certain common

<sup>1</sup> See chs. xv-xvii of Guido Gonella, *Presupposti di un ordine internazionale*, Vatican Polyglot Press, 1942; Engl. trans. ed. T. L. Bouscaren, S.J., New York, 1944. (An independent English edition is now in the press with Burns, Oates.)

<sup>2</sup> Text in Cmd. 6511 (March, 1944).

principles in the national policies of their respective countries." That was in August, 1941. On July 14th, 1943, Mr. Churchill characterised the Charter (in reply to a Commons' question) as "guidance." The following day, Mr. Attlee in the Commons excepted Germany from among those who could appeal to the Charter as of right. On March 9th, 1944, a motion was tabled by 63 M.Ps., led by Mr. Rhys Davies, criticising the Government's interpretation of the Charter. This motion was debated a week later, and the Prime Minister took the line of challenging a Vote of Censure. A week later, 40 of the original 63 members met again and decided to ask for a "clarification" debate. On April 4th the Charter was debated in the Lords at the instigation of Lord Noel Buxton, and the debate postponed indefinitely. On December 15th Mr. Churchill excepted Poland from the areas covered by clause 2 of the Charter.<sup>1</sup>

By now there was widespread disquiet as to how far the Charter was to be the basis of principle on which the detailed machinery of Dumbarton Oaks would be worked out. There was even some cynicism in the Commons' first debate on Poland. But two official utterances did something to restore confidence early in the new year. One was Mr. Roosevelt's address to Congress on January 7th:

It is true that the statement of principles in the Atlantic Charter does not provide rules of easy application to each and every one of this war-torn world's tangled situations. But it is a good and useful thing—it is an essential thing—to have principles towards which we campaign. And we shall not hesitate to use our influence—and to use it now—to secure so far as is humanly possible the fulfilment of the principles of the Atlantic Charter.<sup>2</sup>

The other was Mr. Churchill's paragraph on Unconditional Surrender, during the Commons' debate on Greece on January 18th:

The President of the United States and I, in your name, have repeatedly declared that the enforcement of unconditional surrender upon the enemy in no way relieves the victorious Powers of their obligations towards humanity, or of their duties as civilized and Christian nations.<sup>3</sup>

Nevertheless, the development of the Polish situation since the Soviet establishment of the Polish Committee of National Liberation last July 22nd, and since the incorporation of the Baltic States into the U.S.S.R. in July-August, 1940, has turned many hopes to gall. Mr. Churchill's answer to Mr. Petherick in the Commons on February 21st, that so far as article 2 of the Atlantic Charter went in the Baltic question "the Atlantic Charter is a guide and not a rule," was greeted with ironical laughter. So was Mr. Attlee's silence when asked the same question by Sir Herbert Williams in the same week.

<sup>1</sup> Hansard, vol. 406, No. 11, 15.12.44, cols. 1487-8, 1497, 1505-6, 1564.

<sup>2</sup> *Times* verbatim report, Jan. 8th, 1945.

<sup>3</sup> *Times* verbatim report of speech, Jan. 19th.

And it is against the long-term background of the League years, plus the immediate background of these Atlantic Charter discussions, that the Dumbarton Oaks and the Crimea Proposals have to be set. The latter document reaffirms the Atlantic Charter, though the former had not mentioned it at all.

### III

The "Statement of Tentative Proposals" was issued to the Press on October 9th, after conversations at Dumbarton Oaks that had begun on August 21st.<sup>1</sup> The conversations had been conducted in two successive periods, the Chinese representatives being absent from the first and the Soviet representatives from the second (as the U.S.S.R. is not at war with Japan but on the contrary has a Trade Agreement with her). The British Government subsequently issued a Commentary on the text.<sup>2</sup> The two documents have to be studied together.

The Dumbarton Oaks proposals (in 12 chapters) run to ten pages. They are expressly tentative. The Governments "have agreed that, after further study of these proposals, they will as soon as possible take the necessary steps with a view to the preparation of complete proposals which could then serve as a basis of discussion at a full United Nations' Conference." The final objective is an international organization to be called the United Nations, with a Charter of which this document is the outline.

The purposes of the organization are to be : to maintain peace and security by the collective prevention of aggression and the individual use of peaceful methods of settlement ; to develop friendly international relations ; to co-operate in social and economic problems ; and to harmonize "the actions of nations in the achievement of these common ends."

The principles by which these aims shall be pursued are : the "sovereign equality of all peace-loving States" ; the fulfilment of obligations ; peaceful settlement of disputes ; abstention from threat or use of force against the purposes of the organization ; assistance to the organization under the terms of the Charter ; no assistance to outlaw States ; and treatment of non-member States according to the same canons as members. Membership is "open to all peace-loving States." The organs of the Organization are to be a General Assembly, a Security Council, an International Court of Justice and a Secretariat.

The Assembly is to consider the general principles ; discuss and recommend upon questions brought to it by any member, referring to the Security Council all matters that demand *action*, and not prejudging any matter already being dealt with by that body ; suspend

<sup>1</sup> Cmd. 6560.

<sup>2</sup> Cmd. 6571.



rights and privileges when asked to by the Council ; elect the non-permanent members of the Council and of the Economic Council ; apportion the member States' expenses ; and make studies and reports. Each member State is to have one vote in the Assembly, and the Assembly votes by two-thirds majority on important matters (specified) and by simple majority on others.

The Assembly's functions, in short, are to be deliberative and advisory but not executive. The monopoly of executive power lies with the Council.

This Security Council is to consist of eleven members. Five of them are permanent—the U.S.A., the United Kingdom, the U.S.S.R., China and France. The other six are non-permanent, three for one and three for two years, elected by the Assembly. The eleven together are given "primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security," and they "should act in accordance with the purposes and principles of the Organization." All member-States must accept the decisions of the Council. How the Council is to vote was left open (more on this anon). Other States may attend Council meetings if the Council so invites, and may attend in any case if party to a dispute under consideration by the Council.

The International Court of Justice is to be either the 1920 Permanent Hague Court, or a new creation. All members automatically belong to it, and non-members may do so. International economic co-operation is the responsibility of the Assembly, to which the new Economic and Social Council is to be subordinate. The Secretariat is to be headed by a Secretary-General who shall have access to meetings of the other organs and power to bring before the Security Council any matter he fears may prejudice the peace.

The Charter is not to prejudice any action taken or authorised by Governments against the enemy in the present war. And, once in force, the Charter can be amended only by (a) a two-thirds vote in the Assembly, followed by (b) ratification by all the permanent Council members and a majority of the other members, individually.

So much for framework. All hangs on the provisions for action. These (chapter 8) are reserved to the Security Council. The Council may investigate any dispute, whether brought to it or not. Members are obliged in advance to bring disputes to the Council if peaceful methods of settlement fail. The Council can intervene at any stage of a dispute, excepting only "domestic" disputes within a State (these, according to the *Commentary*, para. 36, "may require further consideration"). When the Council deems that failure to settle the dispute may endanger the general peace, it is to take what action it sees fit to prevent that, by diplomatic and economic measures short of armed force. If these measures are inadequate, the Council may proceed to armed force of all kinds. For this purpose, member States are to arrange, and pledge, in advance, their quotas of forces



and facilities : subject to approval by the Council and constitutional ratification by themselves. But for *urgent* cases there must be available, in advance, national Air Force contingents, to be fixed and controlled by the Council with the assistance of its Military Staff Committee. None of this is to preclude "regional arrangements," though no enforcement action may be taken under a regional arrangement without the approval of the Council.

## IV

The British official *Commentary* on these Proposals considers them in the light of "the experience of the last 25 years." They are *flexible* proposals, in order to meet unforeseen circumstances. They make provision for *speedy* action where necessary, by having the Security Council in permanent session (cl. vi, D, 1) and giving it such wide powers of prevention (viii, A, 1 ; viii, B, 1-2). They also profit from the faults of the League organization.

Whereas the League Covenant left open three sets of circumstances in which the right to private war was not abolished, the new Charter closes this "gap in the Covenant" by empowering the Council to take steps even before a dispute has matured. Under the Covenant, sanctions had depended on the decision of the individual members to apply them ; under the Charter they are pledged in advance. Under the Covenant, the occasions for applying sanctions were defined and limited ; under the Charter the Council decides on each new occasion, and has moreover military quotas ready all the time. Under the Covenant, too, economic co-operation had been left unco-ordinated. It is to be so no longer.

As the member States are declared sovereign equals, "the first criterion for action," says the *Commentary*, "is not power but the equal rights of all States" to their political independence. "In general, action by the Organization or its members which is not in accordance with these principles would be illegal. Hence they would be a protection against the arbitrary use of power by the Organization or its members. . . ." And there is no right of resignation ; membership, once undertaken, is for all time.

All the pieces are locked together by the Security Council. "The powers to be conferred on the Security Council are greater than have ever before been given to an international body. But, as already noted, the Security Council must act only in accordance with the Purposes and Principles of the Organization" (para. 26).

It is on this last point that the doubts of critics since October 9th have centred. How is the Security Council to arrive at its executive decisions, involving (as they may do) armed action that will be ordered by the Council from sovereign States? And further *Quis custodiet ipsos custodes*?

"It is obvious," says the *Commentary* (para. 28),

"that the method by which the Security Council is to reach the important decisions which it would have to make is of outstanding importance. Under the Covenant, decisions of the Council required generally speaking a unanimous vote of the members. It does not seem likely that this rule will be adopted for the Security Council, but if preference is given to the rule that decisions shall be taken by a majority, certain difficulties present themselves which require careful study. The special position of the members with permanent seats, on whom the main burden of maintaining international peace and security will fall, will need special consideration. These questions have therefore been reserved for further study . . .".

## V

These questions are indeed the crux. The case for speedy action, when and where necessary, is unassailable. The League of Nations always suffered through lack of provisions for it. The whole point of the Geneva Protocol of 1924 was to provide it—by making *every* dispute amenable to arbitration (thereby "closing the gap in the Covenant") and by making arbitration *compulsory* and not merely obligatory: so that there should be an "automatic test" of aggression, the aggressor being that State which refused to arbitrate, and sanctions following at once accordingly. But the British Government declined to ratify the Protocol, since it would "put the British Navy at the orders of the League" (was it not there already, under the Covenant?), and substituted instead the device of regional pacts within the League (at Locarno). Dumbarton Oaks, rightly determined on speed, enshrines the principle of supreme executive authority for the Council, even making inroads on national sovereignty to the extent of giving the Council control over national contingents in advance. But, as the five permanent members of the Council have a veto on practically everything, the question of moment is "How will the Council vote?"

So important is that issue, that other doubts about the document, and suspicions of venality, hardly matter. It is true that the phrase "peace-loving States" can mean anything or nothing. It is true that only one of the "Principles" of association (see above) is really a moral principle, and that the rest are only pledges to do or not to do certain things. It is true that the new World Court is not—so far as can be divined—to have a jurisdiction in cases of equity (where there is no clear point of *law* at issue in a dispute). But even if these matters were put right beyond cavil, all would still depend on (a) by what means the all-powerful Security Council is to take its decisions, and (b) under what guarantees against its own tyranny?

On this there are two views: one championed by the Soviet Government, the other championed by the smaller states.

According to the Soviet view, the Great Powers must be unanimous in their decisions on questions affecting international order and peace. Short of unanimity, there must not be a "Council" decision. This is categorically stated in the famous *Isvestia* leading-article of October 10th, 1944 :

At these talks there was also a proposal to renounce the application of this principle of unanimity in cases of disputes concerning one of the permanent members of the Council. In such cases it was proposed that such a member should not have the right to take part in the voting. But the acceptance of such a proposal would be a negation of the principle . . . and an attempt to settle such questions behind the back of the Power concerned. . . . If unanimity is required in the settlement of all questions considered by the Council to which no objection is raised, then it would appear all the more necessary in the settlement of important questions affecting the very essence of the activity of the Security Council. . . . The principle of unanimity and agreement between the leading Powers is the cornerstone of the whole international organization, in respect of which no exceptions should be tolerated.

The strength of this argument is not moral but political and "realist." It was well summarized by the *New Statesman* the same week :

It accepts, as the central fact of the post-war situation, that power will be largely concentrated in the hands of a few great States. . . . But it does not pretend that (they) can be induced to divest themselves of their supreme power.

Or, as *The Times* Washington Correspondent put it on February 15th, while it is true to say that the Russian thesis gives each Great Power a *veto* on the discussion of any problem affecting its own main interests, it is equally true that, machinery or no machinery, a Great Power would go its own way in such questions anyhow. This commentator did not draw the obvious moral conclusion. But the *New Statesman* did :

If that is realism—if the Great Powers will not submit themselves to any law above them—then no genuine federation, confederation or World State is possible. . . . If the lawmaking authority is not more powerful than individual States, then we are condemned for the time being to a form of Holy Alliance whose existence depends on continued agreement between the main Allies. . . . And since that is the reality, it is perhaps as well that no verbal camouflage has been used to cover the fact that neither America, Russia or Britain would accept a vote to decide whether they were aggressors within their own sphere of interest.<sup>1</sup>

And certainly that is what the neutral and the small nations' press thought. The Swedish *Dagens Nyheter* of October 11th presented Dumbarton Oaks as a coalition of the victorious Powers, with no pretence at the creation of justice in the community of nations. *Svenska*

<sup>1</sup> October 14th.

*Morgenbladet* admitted that, if a basic unity among the Great Powers were really achieved, then perhaps it might fulfil its primary task of preserving peace. But :

If, on the other hand, this unity fails to be achieved ; if blocs of Great Powers should arise, drawing others each into its own zone ; and if spheres of interest should be created within the framework of the League—and the paragraph relating to regional agreements does not bode well on that point ; then the world situation grows quite dark : so dark, in fact, that the international organization can really only make it worse.<sup>1</sup>

The Turkish view was to a like effect. It is best summed up in the words of Sadak in *Aksham*, the same day :

The Allied nations are the only ones that will be able to stand on their feet after this war. Thus the task of playing the watchman to the world after the war will be left exclusively to them. If the possibility exists that these nations will not be able to live in a united peace, or to work in a united collaboration, it would mean that these nations have no faith in each other. And this problem can be solved only by (them), and by no one else.

In both these countries, as well as amongst the smaller United Nations, the hegemony of the Big Four, together with the extent to which newspapers like *The Times* were ready to subordinate every consideration to preserving an outward harmony among the Security Council's permanent members,<sup>2</sup> struck a note of fear and disillusionment, especially when the practical effect of "unanimity" among the Great Powers showed itself in the Crimean decision on the frontiers of Poland. No one had been able to explain why the Eastern frontier of Poland had to be the sole exception to the rule about leaving frontier rectifications until the Peace Conference. No one had been able to explain why, if what mattered here was Russian security against Germany, it was the Eastern and not rather the Western frontier of a friendly Poland that needed quick settlement. And as for the Baltic States' incorporation into the U.S.S.R., Sir Stafford Cripps had offered *de facto* recognition of that by the British Government as long ago as October, 1940.<sup>3</sup>

On the day before the Crimean Conference decisions were issued to the world, the Netherlands Government in London made an official suggestion on the crucial voting question for the Security Council. It urged that "States which, in respect of their importance, follow immediately on the Great Powers, should be represented on the Security Council ; and that the agreement of at least half of these States

<sup>1</sup> October 11th.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. *The Times*, Sept. 25th : "It is certain that the organization cannot in practice be called upon to arraign or discipline one of the Great Powers. . . . Its fundamental assumption is the co-operation of the Great Powers ; or, failing that, it cannot exist ; and no vote of a majority, however qualified, can be safely admitted on any issue which would call this assumption in question." That means, in practice, the condoning of aggression, and the erection of Appeasement into the foundation-principle of the whole moral swindle.

<sup>3</sup> W. P. and Z. K. Coates, *Anglo-Soviet Relations*, London, 1943, p. 651.



should be necessary for a decision on the Council.”<sup>1</sup> Next day it was revealed that the Crimean discussions had “solved” the voting question. Four days later *The Times* reported from Washington the supposed terms of the solution—that there might be a majority vote on questions that did not involve punitive measures, while matters involving Sanctions could not be decided without the concurrence of all the permanent members.

There had all along been explanations that people who supposed the unanimity formula was a sop to the Soviet Union must be dismissed as cynics. For, quite apart from any alleged Russian determination to have its own way, there was the ordinary constitutional difficulty in some countries—especially the United States—of the Executive being unable to declare war (or to pledge contingents of troops in advance) without the consent of Parliament. But, so far as concerned the U.S.A., this objection was solved in a long letter from John W. Davis and other internationalists which appeared in the *New York Times* of November 5th “to their own, and to this newspaper’s, satisfaction.” “There is precedent for the use of the armed forces without a previous declaration of war. There is also a constitutional distinction between such use and an actual state of war.” But it was not the technical factors that were worrying the neutrals and the small States.

The issue was, and still remains after the Yalta Report and the Commons’ debate of February 27th onwards, a clear issue of *bona fides*. It is admittedly undeniable that, if the harmony amongst the Great Powers, who (alone) have the material strength, breaks down, no paper machinery can suffice by itself to prevent a third world war. So much is obvious. It is the greatest single lesson that has been learnt by the most ingenuous *doctrinaires* of the League era. Thus far *The Times* is unassailably right. But two conclusions can be drawn from that fact. One is to say that nothing therefore—not even the basic rights of any nation or State—must be allowed to upset the harmony of the Powers; and to say that, is to deify appeasement. The other is, to make nevertheless an *attempt* to organize the world on a plan wherein the great, no less than the small, are subject to such rules as the great make. International confidence is altogether vain without that—the elementary bedrock principle of third-party judgment, the indispensable minimum moral basis. And it is here that the reactions of the various religious bodies are worth notice.

## V

In the United States, the non-Catholic bodies have pledged themselves to “unconditional approval of the Dumbarton Oaks Plan.”

<sup>1</sup> First put out on the French Radio, February 8th. The text of the Crimean Conference Report was issued on February 12th and published as a White Paper (Cmd. 6598) on Feb. 22nd.

The decision is contained in the Report of the Commission on a Just and Durable Peace set up by the Federal Council of Churches of Christ. During the debates there was wide divergence of opinion. Dr. Charles Clayton Morrison of Chicago, veteran author of *The Outlawry of War* (1927), led a minority who wished to press for nine "improvements" before accepting the document. These included the need for a preamble specifically subscribing to the principles of the Atlantic Charter, for withholding voting rights from *any* country whose case was under consideration by the Security Council, for a Commission on colonial autonomy, and for a disarmament pledge. But the advocates of unconditional acceptance won.<sup>1</sup>

The Catholic Hierarchy in America, on the other hand, spoke out in forthright criticism of the future that is brewing. Their Statement on Dumbarton Oaks appeared on November 18th, signed by the ten Bishops who constitute the Administrative Board of N.C.W.C.

"We have no confidence," they declared, "in a peace which does not carry into effect, without reservations or equivocations, the principles of the Atlantic Charter." They proceeded to lay down the essential moral conditions—translated into action—on which alone any international organization could hope to endure. There must be immediate assistance to prostrate nations, as a matter of emergency. Power Politics must be formally abjured. The new international association must be universal. In no circumstances must any member of it be allowed to be judge in its own cause. Provision for revising treaties in due course must be made explicit. And—because tyranny anywhere threatens the peace of all—the internal régime of a country is the concern of *all* and not merely a domestic issue.

This is a momentous declaration. It does three things of the highest importance. It makes the coming United Nations Charter dependent on the moral principles of the Atlantic Charter; it repudiates the extreme doctrine of non-intervention in the internal concerns of States (since ideological politics *cannot* be kept within national frontiers); and, as the *Washington Post* was quick to see, it "completely divorces the Catholic Church in the United States from the philosophy of (American) Isolationism."<sup>2</sup>

In Great Britain the alignment of Christian opinion, Catholic and Protestant, has run parallel to that in America. Of the non-Catholic religious press, only the Anglican *Church Times* has taken an unequivocal line throughout, and its tone is well epitomized in what it said on December 22nd, after the debate in the Commons on Poland: "Mr. Churchill's speech was a frank admission that if peace is secured it will only be by accord with Russia and the United States. Justice was nowhere. So was the Atlantic Charter." The other Anglican

<sup>1</sup> Report in *New York Times*, Jan. 20th; also in *Spiritual Issues of The War* (publ. Ministry of Information, London, Feb. 22nd).

<sup>2</sup> The full text of the Declaration was given in the *London Catholic Herald* of November 24th.

and Free Church papers, while manifestly uneasy, put the best construction possible on the phrases of Dumbarton Oaks, with a minimum of reference to the concrete background or the past.<sup>1</sup>

The Catholic Press did not mince matters. Here are some of the salient comments :

The man in the street in every country is by now so experienced in disappointments that we do not imagine him ready to accept at face value the first official eulogies. (*Catholic Times*, Oct. 13.)

The real explanation why *The Times* to-day ignores a whole side of the Soviet to which it directed unremitting attention for twenty years, is wishful thinking, a resolve not to see unpleasant facts ; but it is an old and true proverb that " he who will always be a sheep must expect to be eaten by the wolf at last." . . .

The nominal unity of the Big Three is really masking the pursuit by one of them of ends flatly opposed to all those declarations on which the unity rests. (*Tablet*, Nov. 11, and Dec. 23.)

The refusal to envisage true co-operation in the concrete, on the basis of international justice and freedom, remains. Nor is there any guarantee that this policy will be limited in scope. (*Catholic Herald*, Nov. 11.)

We are now reduced to the non-moral doctrine of peace at any price. Unless the Big Four agree, we are told, peace cannot be maintained. Therefore—they must agree. (*Universe*, Nov. 24.)

On February 23rd, for the first time, the Hierarchies of England, Scotland and Wales issued a Joint Statement on the matter. It ranks with the American Catholic declaration outlined above. Above all, it states categorically the main lesson still to be learned by statesmen and politicians :

The truth is that *unless certain principles be acknowledged by all member States of the United Nations*, to this war will succeed not peace but an uneasy space of preparation for another yet more terrible war. . . . *We are convinced that certain principles must be held in common if any family spirit is to be bred among the nations.* Without such a family spirit, renewed strife is inevitable.

That is of course the crux, as the historical reflections on pages 89 and 90 above recalled. It is well to have it on record here and now, in a Joint Statement of the Hierarchies. The detailed points made by their Lordships have all to be read as " subtended " from that. They include a warning against a Peace Treaty too soon after the cessation of hostilities ; a warning against too close an association of the Treaty with the punishment of war criminals ; an insistence on the rights of minorities ; a denunciation (as the American Bishops had given) of the extreme doctrine of non-intervention in the internal affairs of States ; and an eight-point charter of the rights of the human person.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Cf. the editorial in the *Congregational Christian World*, March 8th, which accordingly deplored the speech of the Archbishop of Westminster at the Caxton Hall meeting of the Anglo-Polish Catholic Association on March 5th.

<sup>2</sup> Full text in *London Catholic Press*, February 23rd.

Though this Statement had been drafted before the details of the Crimean Conference were made known, its publication in the Press came some days after those of the Yalta meetings. In the light of these latter, the tone of Catholic commentary had grown more restive and disillusioned already. The following, from the *Catholic Herald* of February 16th, is typical :

The Crimean Conference envisages a settlement of such a nature that the less the Holy See has to do with it the better. Certainly it would be a dreadful thing if posterity could say that the Pope shared any sort of responsibility for the type of peace at present envisaged by the Allied statesmen and the Allied peoples.

"The Allies are acquiescing," said the Archbishop of St. Andrews and Edinburgh in his Lenten Pastoral, "in the destruction of a number of smaller States by one member of the Alliance, not because they feel it to be just, but because they have not the moral courage to protest."

## VI

The Yalta Conference decisions of February 11th<sup>1</sup> are of importance here only in so far as they concern the general framework of international organization planned at Dumbarton Oaks and now to be implemented at San Francisco at the end of April. The sections on the defeat of Germany, together with occupation, control and reparation, lie outside the scope of this article. So also do the sections on Poland and Yugoslavia, except for the psychological and moral shock that the Polish provisions have administered to Christian opinion, in varying degrees, all over the world. The France of General de Gaulle has become piqued at not being represented at the Crimea talks—"We must rely on ourselves," the General had said on October 15th. The Poland of London, India, Monte Cassino and the Home Army was dismayed at the revelation that (frontier apart) the future Government of liberated Poland was to be decided (in effect) by three men of whom not one was a Pole. And neutral opinion, as before, professed to see the new declarations of the Big Three as dubious currency. The Portuguese journal *A Voz* saw no augury of a justly-administered future :

The Yalta Conference has laid down that an Allied Nation—Ally Number One—should have frontiers and a government without the legitimate Government or the public being consulted at all. . . . Some day the British and United States public are bound to ask whither such an intransigent policy may lead. . . . The fact represents more than a catastrophe for those nations whose fate has already been sealed, or who have even been wiped off the map by the memoranda and official notes of international conferences. It is with sorrow that the three small Baltic States find themselves excluded from a free international life.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> The text was issued as a White Paper on Feb. 22nd (Cmd. 6598).

<sup>2</sup> February 23rd.



That is a Catholic paper. But it had been in the van of criticism when what was up for criticism had been German international banditry. *A Voz* has one of the best reputations in Europe for impartiality.

The San Francisco Conference of the United Nations is bound to open with two disquieting notes. One concerns the voting-formula for the Security Council, the other concerns the Soviet attitude to the Conference itself.

The voting formula was given to the world at last on March 5th in terms that confirmed the inspired guess published in *The Times* a fortnight earlier. The summary by the *Times* Diplomatic Correspondent is as concise as any :

Decisions will be taken by a majority of seven out of the eleven members of the Council. The five Great Powers with permanent seats must be included in the seven, an arrangement which gives them a right of veto. They will need, however, the votes of at least two of the six elected members—the smaller States—before they can get a decision. On the other hand, it will not be possible, as it was under the League Covenant, for one small State to block action. If a Great Power is a party to a dispute, it loses its power of veto in certain respects. It cannot prevent the Security Council from considering any dispute and determining whether its continuance endangers the maintenance of international peace and security. It cannot prevent the Council from recommending appropriate procedures or methods of adjustment for the settlement of the dispute. It cannot, furthermore, exercise a veto on the question whether a regional agency shall be asked to concern itself with a dispute. A Great Power does, however, retain its veto in respect of one cardinal matter, even if it is a party to the dispute. This is in the matter of sanctions. Therefore, under the voting formula now proposed, sanctions cannot be inflicted on a Great Power, because such a decision would mean a major war and a breakdown of the machinery for the preservation of world peace.

In short, a Great Power has no veto except in those very circumstances where the small countries fear it *ought not to have one*. The old League at least paid lip-service to the principle that no member-State should be above the Law. The new League abandons even the pretence of doing so. That may be "realism." But if so, the concomitant assurances that all will be well are the sheerest delusion and phantasy. It is on this issue that the alignment of world opinion may well become permanent. It gives, from even before the days when this system will be "official," a cleavage between those who are prone to hope for the best in all circumstances, and those who prophesy that the new League can have no life in it at all.

The other disquieting note arises from what has happened to the original perspective of Dumbarton Oaks. That document described itself as *proposals*, to serve as "*the preparation for complete proposals*," which could then be submitted to the United Nations as "*a basis of discussion*." That being so, the Yalta Proposals are the "complete"

proposals, with San Francisco the place for considering them as "a basis for discussion." This at all events is what the document said, and it is the rock on which French participation in sponsoring the invitations to the San Francisco Conference came to grief. For the U.S.S.R. has decided that "basis of discussion" is no longer the order of the day, but that the San Francisco Conference will meet to *ratify* the proposals. This becomes ominously clear in the official Tass Agency commentary on the French explanation of why General de Gaulle had declined to be a sponsor :

According to information received in authoritative circles (said *Tass* on March 8th) the Provisional Government of France agreed to take part in issuing the invitations . . . under two conditions : (1) *If the wording of the invitation adopted at the Crimean Conference were to be regarded not as a basis for drawing up the rules of the world security organization, but only as a basis for negotiation. . . .* The Soviet Government did not find it possible to agree to these conditions, in as much as their acceptance would have meant in actual fact reconsideration of the Crimean Conference decision on this question.

In other words, the original basis for discussion has now to be accepted as definitive, before the small countries among the United Nations have been able to express views on it at all.

## VII

There, till San Francisco, the issue has rested, apart from the time-honoured customs of lobbying behind the scenes. Nothing that has happened since October has in the least reassured those who were sceptical about the international future. On the political side, the Big Three in action in Poland, together with the *de facto* disappearance of the Baltic States, has come to be regarded as symptomatic of what will be the general fate of the weak, if the agreement of the strong is to be the criterion of action. And on the long view, the deification of "appeasement" will, it is being said, mean a stratification of the world into spheres of influence which—though not necessarily a bad notion in theory—are bound to work ill on the Dumbarton Oaks basis. All depends on what the "influence" is to be.

According to the Dumbarton Oaks theory, the paramount influence is that of peace at all costs. According to the Church, the influence should be that of an agreed basis of moral principles written into the Charter itself and pledged in advance *as a condition of membership*. The greatest politico-moral event of this year, so far, has been the reinforcement of that notion by the two Hierarchies of Great Britain.

And the great task before the individual Catholic citizen in this crisis is to proclaim that central fact.

Peace is not a cause. It is a result. It is the result of order founded on justice and tempered by charity. To seek to maintain "peace," without reference to (indeed, in defiance of) these three other concepts,

is to make disaster predictable. For without these three the word "peace" is altogether meaningless, save in the psychological realms of make-believe and self-delusion.

But there lies also the great danger for the Catholic critic. Negative depreciation is easy. What matters even more is positive and constructive alternative proposals. If we say the new order is likely to die, we must add, as an earnest contribution to first-aid treatment, the positive behest that the long experience and high wisdom of the Church give us. The Church is "against" things only in so far as they themselves negate the positive principles of Christian life.

Dumbarton Oaks needs, in the light of that, two warnings. One, because the document itself enshrines no moral principles—as such—at all. The other, because at the very least there should be clearly asserted in the United Nations Charter one simple moral principle whose observance will be the test of all others: *the principle, in all circumstances, of third-party-judgment*, with loyalty to it pledged in advance. It is not necessary to elaborate a fresh Code of International Ethics. That one touchstone of sincerity will suffice to begin with. For it is a touchstone. If the Great Powers accept it and go back on it afterwards, that is one thing. But if they decline to accept it, we know in advance that they are shady stewards of their power. Until they do accept it, the Christian citizen has one persisting criticism and one fundamental doubt unresolved: wherefore, while they scrabble in the Conference Room, we shall stay outside—to help them with our prayers.

"PENGUIN"

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#### SHORT NOTICE

Father Hubert McEvoy, S.J., has put together a quite admirable account of the Mass in **The Sacrifice We Offer** (Oliver & Boyd, Edinburgh: 3s. 6d. n.). Each part of the Mass is studied and explained, with interesting historical remarks to show how the parts have grown together into the Church's central liturgical act. What is specially valuable is the series of photographs on the right hand pages which reveal the celebrant at various moments during the Holy Sacrifice. One or two of the pictures are slightly blurred but the series is, on the whole, most helpful and has been very artistically taken. Under the pictures are English versions of collects, introits, sequences, and of portions of prefaces and the Canon, intended to bring out the spirit of this or the other part of the Mass. Possibly too great care has been taken to fill all available space, with the result that the page seems at times a trifle crowded. But, these two points of slight criticism apart, Father McEvoy's book deserves full marks. It is just what is wanted to introduce young Catholics—and others not quite so young—to a thorough and intelligent appreciation of the great Sacrifice. It is not a prayer-book but should be read beforehand and in preparation. An excellent present—for birthdays and like occasions. We commend it too for use by teachers and youth leaders.

## THE RESURRECTION

“IF Christ be not risen,” wrote St. Paul to the Corinthians (I, xv. 14), “if Christ be not risen, then is our preaching vain and your faith also is vain” : and again in the same Epistle, “If in this life only we have hope in Christ, then are we of all men the most miserable.” The truth of all the claims of Christ to divinity, to oneness with the Father, to a unique right and authority of revealing God to men and of laying down for them the certain terms and conditions of salvation, and with this the guarantee also that all His promises will be fulfilled, stand or fall with the truth of His Resurrection from the dead. Again and again, often in so many unequivocal words, oftener still by unmistakable implication, He offered this fact as final proof of all that He claimed to be and to do and to have, so that the Resurrection of Christ is to be recognised as the divine seal and signature of the whole Christian revelation from which spring all our faith in this present life and all our hope of the life to come.

But if it did not happen, then, as St. Paul says, our belief is groundless, our hope is a delusion, we are the victims of a lie. If it did not happen, then the support has been knocked away from all that gives to our life any value and to ourselves courage and endurance to face it. If it did not happen, then there is no meaning in anything : life is what the disillusioned Macbeth called it, “a tale told by an idiot, full of sound and fury, signifying nothing,” a shadow-show, an hour of artificial day between night and night, a momentary pause on the way from nowhere to nowhere.

Again : if in this life only we have hope in Christ, that is, if He is no more than a superlative human teacher ; an example, however transcendent yet mortal like ourselves—in other words, if He be not risen—then it will be in a metaphorical sense only that we can say with St. Paul that “I live, now not I, but Christ liveth in me,” and His promised communication of His life to us will be no more than a figure of speech : whereas the whole structure of true Christianity is built upon, and directed to, the practical expression of our belief that in each of us there stirs the very life of our Founder, now *our* own as well as *His* own, through baptism in Whose name we have put off what St. Paul calls “the old man” and have become new Christ-persons. For He is the second Adam : and immeasurably more than that, since unlike the first Adam He is personally identified with each member of the new mystical creation, the new Christ-race, to which we belong.

But because we *know* that Our Redeemer liveth, that He was not (as the High Priests called Him) a “seducer,” we accept—not blindly,



indeed, but all the more surely just because our eyes are wide open—His leadership and His promises in which alone are to be found guidance among the problems of our life. Did not even these High Priests themselves evidence, by the nervous precautions that they devised, how they realised of what awful truth His resurrection from the dead might be the irrefragable proof?

It is, however, no derogation of our Faith to examine, or at least to rehearse in our minds, the principal supports that are offered to it by our reason, and so perhaps to fortify the real, as distinct from the notional, assent that we give to the mystery. We may therefore quite objectively ask ourselves whether there is, in the natural order, any sort of flaw in the evidence upon which the truth of the Resurrection of Christ from the dead is accepted?

We remind ourselves that even if we were to admit (which of course we do not, though rationalist critics have often, but unconvincingly, professed to do so) that all the miracles of Christ recorded in the Gospels are susceptible of a natural explanation by some such hypotheses as misunderstanding, illusion, ignorance, auto-suggestion, or a precocious knowledge of physical forces still hidden from the world, we should yet have to maintain intact and inviolable the miracle of His Resurrection. For all His other miracles, though unquestionably in themselves demonstrative and confirmatory of His paramount claim to divinity, were yet directly concerned in the first place with establishing the truth of His doctrine on various specific points—with the forgiveness of sin, for instance, the love of God for His creatures and His unceasing care of them, His justice, mercy and fidelity, and so forth. But the crowning miracle of His Resurrection stands alone as first and foremost the undebatable, sheerly convincing, evidence of His Godhead which, to borrow the phrase of *Isaias*, we are to "see and know and consider and understand."

To say that from a purely rational point of view the historical evidence of the Resurrection of Christ is altogether unassailable, would be to say too much. But what we can say is that even from that point of view alone it is at least as well established as any other fact of history of which no one has, or ever has had, any doubt whatever. Indeed, apart from such objections as quite gratuitously impugn the morality (not to say the sanity) of contemporary witnesses such as the Apostles, the holy women, the "more than five hundred brethren at once" referred to by St. Paul in the 1st Corinthians, and many others, there appear to be two points only which occasion (not doubt, indeed, but) some real difficulty. The first arises from the considerable discrepancies that exist between the several accounts of the visit of the holy women to the Tomb as given by the four Evangelists; which even such an authority as *Père Lagrange* confesses that he finds troublesome. Rightly viewed, however, one perceives that these superficial variations strengthen rather than debilitate the credibility of the

Gospel account. For, first, if (as is insinuated) the Evangelists had made up the story, surely they would have taken the elementary precaution of making up the *same* story. They were contemporaries, and could easily have compared notes. That they did not do so in regard of these particulars is at least a suasive argument in favour of the objective truth of the event which they record with a characteristic indifference to unessential detail. And secondly, if (as must have been the case) they derived their account of the events of that first Easter morning from the women themselves, who is there who has not experienced how the eyewitnesses of any striking incident, while agreeing as to what actually happened, will often disagree quite markedly as to just *how* it happened : so much so that in ordinary life one feels in fact inclined to be rather suspicious of what seems to us a too complete concord between testimonies from different sources ?

The second point which some have used to discredit the truth of Christ's Resurrection is the fact that all the testimony to its occurrence comes from His friends, not from His enemies, and that He showed Himself only to those who already believed in Him, whose evidence, therefore, would be at least suspect in the minds of those who did not. Why, it is said, did He not show Himself also to Pilate, to Annas and Caiaphas, or to any of the hostile Scribes and Pharisees whose testimony, unwilling as it would have been, must surely on that account be the more convincing ? But one realises that the policy of inflexible resistance to His teaching and to its confirmatory miracles which these sectaries had clearly all along pursued, would most certainly have obliged them to resist this too. They were of that not uncommon type of men who so inveterately *will* not, that at last they *can* not, surrender an opinion or a prejudice that they have once conceived. For illustration of this we need look no further than the example of the High Priests, who when confronted with the evidence of the Roman soldiers that the body of Christ had vanished before their very eyes, were not concerned to *deny* the fact but only to *hide* it.

But, it may be said, you cannot divide the whole population of Palestine sharply into a small group favourable to Christ on the one hand, and an immense majority actively opposed to Him on the other. There must have been many outside the number of His professed disciples whom the sight of the risen Christ would have brought at once to His feet. But there is nothing in the Gospel narrative to preclude the possibility of His having shown Himself to many others besides His immediate followers : indeed there are (particularly in the Acts of the Apostles) passages indicating such a rapid growth of the Christian body from the very beginning as makes this supposition a quite likely one.

The Christian, therefore, need offer no apology to the unbelieving world for his acceptance of the Resurrection of Christ as an absolutely certain historical fact according to the normal canons of

judgement in such matters. Those who quite justly give their assent to the veracity of some record of "old unhappy far off things and battles long ago" because, they say, it is scientifically established, but in the name of the same science refuse it to the equally well-established record of an event of such acknowledged import and consequence as this, stultify the grounds of their disbelief, unless indeed it be scientific to deny the validity of an argument not because of *how*, but because of *what*, it proves. One can hardly resist applying to those who with all the straightforward evidence of Christ's Resurrection before them still refuse to accept it, the condemnation as "inexcusable" passed, in the words of the Book of Wisdom, upon those who "being able to know so much as to make a judgment of the world, do not find out the Lord thereof."

But for us the Resurrection of Christ from the dead has immeasurably more than historical significance. It is, as has been said, the cornerstone of "the Holy City, the New Jerusalem," as St. John calls that new Covenant of God with man which is the Christian Revelation. It is to that what the signature is to a cheque, by which alone the sum for which it is drawn can be realised and is made available. Through it we know that the inner values of which the Sacraments are the outward signs are converted into spiritual force, and we are made one with Christ, are fed upon His flesh and blood and our sins are forgiven and the Holy Ghost dwells in our souls, because it proves not only that all that He has told us is true and that all His promises will certainly be honoured, but that this is so because He who spoke and made these promises is really and truly God, consubstantial with the Father, since the absolute dominion over His own self in virtue of which He laid His life down at will and at will took it up again, is an attribute consonant only with the self-existence of God, a sign which essentially signifies that for which it was invoked and could mean nothing less nor indeed anything else.

Further : because of the Resurrection we now have the assurance of an everlasting life which is not to be lost by any agency but our own. Because Christ, who is God, faced human life, lived every detail of it, bore all that it involved, even suffering and the agony of death, and rose again in the strength of His own life-power, so to us now through that same life of His infused into us at Baptism by mystical incorporation with Him, and renewed and strengthened with every Absolution and every Communion, is assured the certainty (so long as we preserve it, and again as often as having lost it, we recover it) of coming through our own lives victoriously as He did, even should we seem to ourselves and to others to be dead and buried as He seemed to be. And not only at the end, but all through our lives (as all through His) such deathly things as loss and failure and pain and disgrace and every kind of sorrow are through Him translated for us into life-giving sacraments, holy, redemptive, creative things.

Just as in virtue of what Mother Julian of Norwich calls our "one-ing" with Christ, and in Him with all creation, through the mystery of the Incarnation, we are, in the words of St. Paul "made partakers of His sufferings" so that every creature, in its degree, is entitled to say that "my pain, and the pain of all the world, is mystically one with the Passion of Christ"; so we are in a true sense, by the mystery of His Resurrection, made partakers of the revivifying force of His Risen Life—what St. Paul in the same place calls "His consolation."

Every uprising from sin, every recovery of failing faith or hope or charity, every impulse to better things and higher ideals, is the Resurrection of Christ within us. It is, further, the chief support of our belief (so nearly impossible at times to sustain) that "all things work together unto good to such as are called according to His purpose"; and that nothing befalls us but by His will and through His love of us; since in even so dismaying a thing as the Passion and Death of God made Man, wherein it seemed that the right had been irrecoverably defeated and that all was lost, God's purpose was none the less fulfilled without check or deviation, and all was well.

The fact of Christ's death and resurrection is for us the key to the truth about everything, to the God-like understanding of all earthly happenings, right and wrong and better and best: for it is the "acted expression" (so to say), as far as we can now apprehend it, of His own divine vision. For the same reason, too, it provides the clue to the only solution of those painful mysteries which in this life can have no other explanation, and resist all other evidence, than that of faith. Because of it we should find it easier to believe, and to act upon the belief, that in all circumstances and in all times and all places, and happen what may to us of good or of evil, ever, in the words of the Psalmist, "His hand leadeth us and His right hand holdeth us."

R. H. J. STEUART.

## "THE MONTH" FORWARDING SCHEME

### IMPORTANT NOTICE

Will readers and missionaries who are members of the Forwarding Scheme, please note that during a recent air attack on London all the reference books and the card index relating to the Scheme were destroyed when the private house where the work has been done since the war, was severely damaged. All names and addresses were lost and the Hon. Secretary is therefore unable to write to those who have written but failed to enclose their full address. It is also not possible to look up information which some missionaries and readers have asked for. There was a waiting list of Missionaries who had asked for *THE MONTH*; this too was lost. Will those who would like *THE MONTH* please send their names and addresses, in **BLOCK** letters, to the secretary?



## THE POLISH TRAGEDY

### REFLECTIONS ON THE YALTA CONFERENCE & DEBATE

THE volumes of Hansard for the three days' debate on the Crimea Conference were not very cheerful reading. Nearly four hundred pairs of feet shuffled into the Government lobby on the second day, to negative the amendment on Poland ; a few pairs over the four hundred walked in the same direction on the day following, to give Mr. Churchill that vote of confidence upon which he had insisted. Yet, if the feet were largely to one side of the House of Commons, the good arguments were, for the most part, on the other—except, you will observe, the all-compelling argument of necessity. The vote of confidence cannot have been as re-assuring as the Prime Minister had hoped. Several members who did not vote for the amendment voiced their genuine uneasiness ; some of them expressed their readiness to accept the Yalta solution of Russo-Polish problems as a fact of power, not an act of justice. Yet Mr. Churchill had founded his case upon the second, not the first, of these suppositions ; he asserted that the solution was a just one, and that he had in no wise yielded to force. There is, I think, a considerable body of opinion in this country which regrets and deplores the solution as unjust but will accept it, on the grounds that the Prime Minister had no practical alternative, that, in order to secure the full and continued co-operation of Russia (perhaps, also against Japan, for Mr. Roosevelt has admitted that the Crimea Conference has its "secret understandings"), he had to agree to the Russian terms. If that is not yielding to force, then the expression is without meaning. To this body of opinion the arguments, firstly, that it was necessary to impose this solution at once without awaiting the end of the European war, secondly, that it was impossible to consult the Polish Government because of the existence of the Lublin Government, though Mr. Eden has stated emphatically that we do not and never shall recognize that puppet organization, and even thirdly, that the Poles will be happier and more prosperous when they have been deprived of their Eastern provinces and given some bits and pieces of German territory, are singularly specious and inept.

The vote of confidence had to be given ; again, there was no practical alternative. But its worth ought not to be exaggerated. It was a frank acknowledgement that we have a war (indeed, two wars) to finish ; that it can be finished only through co-operation with Russia, just as it will not be possible to establish conditions of peace on the Continent without Russian collaboration. Yet behind the vote of

confidence—overwhelming on paper but to some extent a paper vote—were doubts and reservations, and the feeling that we were finally abandoning moral considerations, such as had been incorporated in the Atlantic Charter, for a solution of pure expediency.

Speaking towards the close of the debate, Mr. Pickthorn summed up the Government speeches as follows :

The Prime Minister said that for the purpose of our country's international relations, it was necessary that he should have as nearly as possible the unanimous support of the House of Commons. That was the first step in the argument. The second step in the argument was that he ought to have the unanimous support of the House of Commons because what he had done, he had done under no compulsion of force or circumstances ; he had done it because he thought it right in itself. I think it is almost true that every one of the supporters of the Government took exactly the opposite line—very nearly everyone, and very conspicuously my hon. and gallant friend, the Member for Stafford (Captain Thorneycroft) and the hon. gentleman, the Member for West Leicester (Mr. H. Nicolson). They took very much the opposite line about "power not justice."

The line taken by—I was going to say the Leader of the Opposition (Mr. A. Greenwood) but I do not know what he ought to be called—perhaps I might say, my right hon. friend from the collaborationist bench—about this Motion was that, of course, it did not really mean anything, we all had an indefinite number of mental reservations. I really think that almost all the value is taken out of it, partly by that, and partly by the fact that the Prime Minister put his claim upon one ground and that his supporters put their claim upon quite a different ground.

Now I think that the Poles can understand the delicate and difficult position in which the British Government was placed, on account of its need of Russian collaboration. What they find hard to understand is the pretence that the Yalta solution is a just solution, the attempt to throw a cloak of smarmy righteousness over what has been, at best, a most unfortunate affair. What they consider both bitterly unkind and egregiously unfair is the Press campaign, here conducted, to misrepresent the Polish claims and the Polish Government, to attach opprobrious epithets to men who have been amazingly patient and loyal, to pillory the Polish people as difficult, emotional, the enemies of unity among themselves and among the allies. They have indeed been treated disgracefully, dishonestly, by many organs of the British Press.

The Poles, we have been informed, are a difficult people. So, I fancy would be most Englishmen, were the United States—let us say—to retain as American property the West Indian air bases we have leased them or—a better analogy—claim to take over Wales and South-West England as the forty-ninth and fiftieth States of the American Union, even with the approval of Soviet Russia. The Poles, it is said, are emotional : this means, of course, that they are

strongly attached to their country, as we happen, curiously, to be attached to ours, and that they fought and suffered for it, preserving their national existence, their culture and ideals, under alien and brutal rule. The Poles, we learn, cannot unite together. Really. They were united enough in September, 1939, when they withstood the German onslaught; they have remained sufficiently united to provide no single quisling to sponsor a puppet Government for the German advantage. No Polish volunteers have fought for Germany—a thing which can be said of no other European country, not even Russia, since there were Cossack formations in both France and the Balkans under German orders, and Russian troops, under General Vlasov, have been fighting Eastwards of Berlin. Yes, but what of the lack of unity between the London Government of the Poles and that of Lublin? I never recall any protest to the Norwegian Government on the grounds that it had not come to terms with the "Lublin" administration in Norway of M. Quisling; nor was M. Pierlot, when Prime Minister of Belgium and resident in London, taken to task on account of his unwillingness to enter a joint administration with the Belgian Rexist leader, M. Degrelle; we put no very firm pressure on General de Gaulle to run in double harness with M. Laval. Nor, finally, had the situation been drastically altered—on the lines of Saki's entertaining fantasia, "When William Came"—could I picture Mr. Churchill and Mr. Eden speeding back from their exile in Delhi or Washington to help to "broaden" a neo-Lublin Government, presided over by Messrs. Gallacher and Pollitt. Nastiest of all was the charge that the Polish Government in London was Fascist in personnel or sympathies—a charge refuted indignantly, in the December debate, by Mr. Ivor Thomas, who told the House of Commons that not one of its members was "fit to hold a candle" to General Bor-Komarowski, the heroic defender of Warsaw, and that, while his Labour colleagues had been singing at their annual conference about "dungeons dark," M. Arciszewski, the Polish Premier, had had personal experience of those dark dungeons.

More serious than this unfriendly and shabby attitude has been a Press campaign of misrepresentation concerning both the actual situation in Poland and Poland's re-emergence from the catacombs of oppression, from 1919-1921. With some aspects of this campaign I shall deal in a moment.

But, first, let us glance at the decisions of the Crimea Conference. These affect, in the first place, the Eastern provinces of Poland—and of that Poland, with which we entered into so close a relationship in 1939. As far West as the so-called Curzon Line, these provinces now go to Russia. No question of election or appeal. The inhabitants are not to be asked their opinion of the change; the Polish Government was allowed no voice in discussion or decision. The exclusion of the people whose future was being planned from any vote on the decision

is thoroughly undemocratic, and is in flagrant contradiction with article No. 2 of the Atlantic Charter ; the settlement of so important a question without the slightest reference to the legitimate Government of Poland is as violent a breach of international relations as any act could be, short of open war.

As "compensation," the Poles are to be provided with some slices of German land, the direction and extent of which are to be settled later.

The more you reflect on this decision, the more extraordinary it must appear. It is as though the Poles were a defeated people, to be treated ruthlessly—more ruthlessly indeed than the Germans who have been mainly responsible for this devastating war. For no one has yet suggested that very nearly half of Germany's territory should be parcelled out among her neighbours, with no reference at all to the wishes of the population. The fact is that Poland is one of the victorious allies, and the one that has fought with Britain, to the very best of her ability, from the beginning till now. It is significant of the fundamentally unsympathetic attitude which many sections of Englishmen have adopted towards the people of Poland that papers like the *Times* have published more anxious letters about the folly of taking away a small measure of German territory than the wickedness of robbing Poland of very nearly half her land.

There is another consideration, brought out by Mr. Pickthorn in the speech already mentioned :

It seems to me that however much this may be the best arrangement, and however much it may be said that the Poles are idiots for wanting to keep their old provinces or for not wanting to have chunks of Germany, what sticks in my gizzard, what I find impossible to give positive approval to, is that so far as I know it is *the first time in history that one country has had both its régime and its boundaries altered in the course of a war by three other nations—all in alliance with it, or at least, two of them are in alliance in every sense of the word, and the third is in alliance in one sense or another—without that country being present.*

The second major decision concerns Western Poland, to the other side of the Curzon Line. The United States, Britain and Russia have affirmed their desire to see established "a strong, free, independent and democratic Poland"; they have agreed—so runs the document (on this point the wording should be noted carefully)—on the conditions in which "a new Polish Provisional Government of National Unity may be formed in such a manner as to command recognition by the three major Powers." Notice that what is stressed is not recognition by the majority of the people of Poland (such recognition is already accorded to the Polish Government in London) but recognition by three foreign Powers. In other words, just as the Eastern provinces of Poland have been sacrificed in the interest of co-operation



between the three major Allies, so too this new Provisional Government is to be formed, with that interest primarily in view.

What gives rise to serious doubts is the ambiguity of clauses and phrases used in the agreement. It speaks of "the establishment of a *Polish Provisional Government* which can be more broadly based than was possible before the recent liberation of Western Poland." When we bear in mind Mr. Eden's outspoken rejection of the Lublin Government, the next sentence of the agreement is certainly odd. "*The Provisional Government which is now functioning in Poland* should therefore be reorganized on a broader democratic basis with the inclusion of democratic leaders from Poland itself and from Poles abroad." "From Poles abroad,"—please observe the phrasing—not "from the Polish Government in London." The Yalta agreement mentions the Lublin Government at least on a *de facto* level; the Polish Government in London which is acknowledged by the United States and Britain and by practically all the other United Nations is not referred to, even on that level. Yet Mr. Eden has assured us, on the third day of the Commons' debate, that we do not and never shall, recognize the Lublin Government. The Yalta agreement tells us that the Lublin Government is to be reorganized; it is to be Lublin, enlarged and broadened, but still, fundamentally, Lublin. What other meaning can we seriously give to the expression "reorganized on a broader basis?" There is room for grave ambiguity here.

More opportunities for difference of opinion show themselves as we read further. The new Government is to be formed, not through elections (no doubt, impossible, in the present condition of Poland, certainly impossible while the Red Army is still in occupation), not by any process of amalgamation of "London" and "Lublin," but through a conference in Moscow. The conference consists of three persons, not one of whom is a Pole, and the chief of whom announced, five and a half years ago, when he partitioned Poland with his Nazi counterpart, Herr Ribbentrop, his intention of eradicating Poland from the map for ever. This is M. Molotov, the Russian Foreign Minister. I call him the chief of the three. He is Foreign Minister, and on his home ground; the other are Ambassadors, one British, the second American. Which of the three is likely to have his way, should there be disagreement? The answer is surely a simple one. Clearly, M. Molotov. On the Polish issue, Russia had her way in the Crimea; her Foreign Minister will very probably have his way in Moscow. A second ground of ambiguity resides in the expressions "democratic" and "anti-Nazi." We are informed that in the eventual elections in Poland, which are guaranteed by the three Powers as "free and unfettered" and "on the basis of universal suffrage and secret ballot," "all democratic and anti-Nazi parties shall have the right to take part and to put forward candidates." But who will decide what are democratic parties and who are to be classed as "anti-Nazi"? The



Soviet Press and the Lublin radio have long been pouring forth vilification and abuse of Poles abroad. Members of the Government in London, including M. Mikolajczyk, in whom Mr. Churchill reposed such confidence that, from the time of his retirement until the Commons' debate, neither he nor Mr. Eden had found time to grant an interview to M. Arciszewski, the present Prime Minister, have been pilloried as pro-German and Fascists. One Lublin-inspired motion demanded the exclusion of the President, M. Raczkiewicz, and MM. Mikolajczyk and Arciszewski from all rights of Polish citizenship. General Bor-Komarowski, the Polish Commander-in-Chief, and General Anders, his deputy and the active head of the Polish forces fighting in Italy, have been similarly abused.

The Yalta agreement on Poland left the House of Commons in a very uneasy mood, with the feeling that underlying a certain unity of view and decision many possibilities of serious divergence are latent. Mr. Churchill insisted that we have to trust Russia; Mr. H. Nicolson reminded the House that Russia had behaved very correctly in our regard during the troubles in Greece. We should like very much to trust Russia though the distrust arising from Communist theory and Russian practice, not least of all in Poland, makes it no easy matter. But Russia can win that trust by an honest effort to carry out the paragraphs of the Yalta agreement and to give to the expressions "broadened," "democratic," "free and unfettered elections" a genuine and unambiguous meaning, such as we may understand in the traditions of Western Europe and the United States. On our part, we have now assumed new and very grave obligations towards the Polish people. Let us be convinced of that. Let us be aware of their grim earnestness. If we face and fulfil them, history might approve in retrospect the Crimea Conference. If we fail—even worse, if we make little effort—history will certainly condemn it and us.

I have referred to a Press campaign directed against the Poles, and in particular against the Polish Government in London. This has been based upon a number of statements, false or only partially correct, and consequently misleading. Among them are the following :

- (1) The proper frontier for Poland was recognized in 1919-21 to be the Curzon Line ;
- (2) The conditions of the Treaty of Riga were forced by a militant and victorious Poland upon a poor, weak and friendless Soviet Russia.
- (3) There is only a small proportion of Poles in Poland's Eastern provinces ;
- (4) The remaining population of those districts is Russian, only too anxious to be incorporated in Soviet Russia.

These four statements have all to do with the first of the two Polish problems, that of the Eastern provinces. Here it is wise to avoid the word "frontiers." For the question at stake is not that of frontier revision ; it is a question of annexation, and of annexation on a large

scale. Frontier revision is always possible ; it should be brought about by mutual arrangement, not by unilateral show of power. But to take away half the territory of a country has nothing to do with such revision ; it is the equivalent of conquest.

#### (1) THE CURZON LINE.

Poland re-emerged after a century and a half of partition, as the result of Russia's defeat by the Central Powers in 1917, and the defeat of the Central Powers by the Allies in 1918. On armistice day, 1918, Pilsudski who had been a Socialist leader in Austrian-occupied Poland, arrived in Warsaw ; since July, 1917, he had been imprisoned by the Germans in the fortress of Magdeburg. He began at once the task of clearing German troops out of the country ; an interim Government was appointed, which absorbed the various resistance committees.

One of the Government's first tasks was to find Poland. This meant establishing a State, with regular boundaries. In the West, it was not so complicated. There, the Versailles conference could fix the frontiers of the new State. In the first half of 1919, this work was carried through, and, as far as Germany and Austria were concerned, a dividing line was agreed upon. Even here plebiscites had to be held, in one area of East Prussia and in Silesia, the results of which, according to the Poles, left one and half million Poles still under German rule.

Eastwards lay the major problem. Russia had taken about three-quarters of Poland's ancient territory. Russia was now Bolshevik and was not represented at the Versailles conference ; the policy of the Western Powers with regard to Russia was vague and vacillating. Very soon there was war between the newly-raised levies of Poland and the Bolsheviks, who were fighting at the same time against various White Russian forces, which enjoyed considerable sympathy and some support from the Western Powers. It might have been thought that the new Russia would have been friendly towards the Poles. On August 28th, 1918, the Council of People's Commissars passed the following decree :

All treaties and acts concluded by the Government of the former Russian Empire with the Governments of the Kingdom of Prussia and the Austro-Hungarian Empire, *concerning the partitions of Poland*, in view of their being contrary to the principle of the self-determination of nations and the revolutionary sense of law of the Russian nation, *which recognizes the Polish nation's inalienable right to independence and unity*, are hereby repealed irrevocably.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> *Sobranie Uzakonyeny Rasporyazheny Rabocheho i Krestyanskogo Pravitelstva*, No. 64, September 9th, 1918.

C.f. also the speech of Lenin to the All-Russian Conference of the Russian Social Democratic Labour Party, on May 12th, 1917 (Lenin, *Sobranie Sochineny*, Moscow, 1927, vol. xx pp. 275-278), which contained the following paragraphs : "No one has oppressed the Poles as much as have the Russian people. The Russian people have served in the hands of the Czar as the executioner of Polish freedom. . . . Why should we, Great Russians, who have been oppressing a greater number of nations than any other people, why should we repudiate the right of separation for Poland, the Ukraine, Finland? . . . No people can be free which oppresses another people."

Throughout 1919, however, Poles and Bolsheviks were fighting intermittently. On December 8th, 1919, there came from the Allied Supreme Council in Paris a declaration which permitted the Poles to set up civil Government to the West of a line, running Northwards along the river Bug from the juncture of the previous Austrian-Russian frontier (the Northern part of what has come to be known as the Curzon Line). But the document, signed by M. Clemenceau, was careful to add, not once, but twice, that this did not solve the question of Poland's future frontiers to the East. The two reservations are as follows :

- (a) Without prejudice to later terms which may be designed to fix the final Eastern frontier of Poland ;
- (b) The eventual rights of Poland to territories situated to the East of the above-mentioned line are *expressly reserved*.

The Polish Government could now function, with the full approval of the Allies, to the West of the line indicated. The Eastern boundary would have to be settled later.

Previously, the Allied Powers had dealt with one aspect of Eastern Poland, namely the territory of Eastern Galicia, which had been under Austrian rule, and had never belonged to Russia. On November 20th, 1919, they had suggested the division of this area into two parts : the Western, to be Polish unconditionally, the Eastern, to be entrusted to Poland on a twenty-five years' mandate from the League of Nations. The Poles refused to accept the suggestion, as did also the Ukrainians of Eastern Galicia. This is the origin of the so-called Curzon Line A and B, in its Southern region. However, Professor Paton has stated, in Temperley's *History of the Peace Conference of Paris*, that "all the delegation in Paris, except the British, were strongly in favour of assigning the whole territory as a natural unit to Poland."

Meanwhile, the fighting continued. By the end of 1919, the actual Eastern frontier was 250 miles East of the boundary, mentioned in the Allied note of December 8th, 1919, and 100 miles East of the frontier negotiated by the Treaty of Riga. Early in 1920, Polish forces were fighting together with Ukrainian troops as far East as Kiev against the Bolsheviks. Then came a Russian counter-offensive. The Polish Government grew frightened and appealed to the Allies for help. Under some pressure, it agreed to accept an armistice line ; this was the line, laid down in the Allied note of December 8th, 1919, but, as regards Galicia, the proposal was that the Polish and Bolshevik troops should halt where they actually stood. This armistice line was communicated to the Bolshevik authorities by Lord Curzon, then Foreign Secretary. It was not meant as a frontier, but as a line of armistice. The Bolsheviks rejected the proposition declaring that they would negotiate directly with the Poles and on the basis of a territorial settlement more favourable to the Poles than that contained in the note of Lord Curzon.

## (2) THE TREATY OF RIGA.

This appeal of the Polish Government occurred in July, 1920. The Russians were advancing; they reached the outskirts of Warsaw; in Western Europe it was taken for granted that Warsaw would fall and that the Red armies would sweep through Poland and join with revolutionary elements in Germany. A glance at the British Press during August, 1920, gives little support to the theory that militaristic Poles were forcing weak and friendless Russians to conclude an unfair agreement. A Polish peace delegation had been sent to Minsk to begin peace discussions with the Russian authorities. It remained in Minsk during the middle days of August, 1920, and it was then that took place the battle of the Vistula, which made the Russians retreat from Warsaw, in what Viscount D'Abernon has named "The Eighteenth Decisive Battle of the World." The success of the Poles was not conclusive, for some time, as can be seen from the British papers. Meanwhile, terms of peace had been offered to the Polish delegation. These included (in their first form, as communicated to the British Government) :

- (i) The Soviet Government "desire to make it perfectly clear that they recognize the liberty and independence of Poland and manifest their good will by agreeing to a more favourable frontier" (i.e. than the Curzon Line) ;
- (ii) Poland to reduce her army to 50,000 men and establish a "militia of working people for the maintenance of order" ;
- (iii) Poland not to be allowed to manufacture armaments and munitions ;
- (iv) Poland to grant free land to the families of her citizens who were killed, wounded or crippled in the Polish-Soviet war.

(in their second form, as they were communicated to the Polish delegates at Minsk, the following clauses were added) ;

- (i) The Polish Army to number only 10,000 men in all, while the strength of the "People's Militia" was to be 40,000 ;
- (ii) All equipment to be handed over to Soviet Russia, except small arms for 50,000 men ;
- (iii) The strength of the Red Army garrisons at the Polish frontier be 200,000 ;
- (iv) The frontier to be a Curzon Line, modified in Poland's favour ;
- (v) Soviet Russia to have the right of unhindered transport through Poland of persons, without passport control, and of goods, without customs control.

These terms are hardly what a weak and friendly Power would venture to offer to a militaristic neighbour, about to impose a dictated peace.

Now, for one or two extracts from the British Press of the period. As has been mentioned, it took a considerable time for the Western Powers and peoples to realise that the victory of the Poles outside Warsaw had been decisive, and so they were writing, with the danger of a Bolshevik triumph in mind.



A *Times* editorial, for August 19th, 1920, ran in the following strain :

The course of the military operations may be expected to exert a considerable influence on the proceedings at Minsk, where the Russian and Polish delegates have at last met each other. No account of the first sittings has yet reached us from the Poles, and all that the Red report contains is a meagre outline of the Chairman's opening speech. It is not illuminating on several points which the world much desires to know, and doubtless it was not intended so to be, but it does throw a strong light on one important subject. Comrade Danishevski, we are informed, laid great stress upon the Bolshevist recognition of the independence and sovereignty of Poland, and he applied to her the blessed phrase "self-determination." But the Soviet delegate makes it plain that the "self-determination" must be Bolshevist self-determination, if Poland is to expect relatively favourable terms from Bolshevist victors. The peace is to be a class peace. Russia, said the Commissar, is entitled to ask for guarantees from a Poland ruled by landowners—which in fact Poland is not—such as would not have been asked for from a Poland of workmen and peasants. Does it not occur to him and his colleagues that this reasoning is double-edged? Might not the Poles, or others, turn it against the Bolshevists, and argue that they must have very exceptional guarantees from a Russia ruled by a "dictatorship of the proletariat"?

Four days later, came another *Times* editorial, with this time congratulations to the Poles after the victory near Warsaw. The news of the liberation of Polish soil from the Soviet armies

Will give sincere satisfaction to all whose view of the opposing forces is not hopelessly prejudiced by desire for a Bolshevist triumph. Out of the confusion which the partisans of revolution have deliberately thrown about the situation, there emerges, undeniable and ineluctable, the fact that the Polish armies are fighting in the cause of a free Poland. They have the sympathy of Britain, as time and again they have had it in their unhappy history, but to-day the feeling is deepened by a consciousness that incalculably more than the preservation of their independence is at stake.

Then, after warning the Poles not to let success make their demands immoderate, the leader added :

If Poland should again be overwhelmed, or should suffer a diminution of authority within its own borders, the way would be clear for an invasion of Western Europe by the troops and the missionaries of Bolshevism.

On August 25th, an editorial, again in the *Times*, drew the lesson of the contrast between the proposed peace terms, as handed to Earl (then Mr) Lloyd George on August 10th, and as delivered to the Polish delegates in Minsk. In the second list of peace conditions, the *Times* asserted, referring to the "civic militia" demanded by the Soviet authorities,

This casual reference to a "civic militia" has taken on a sinister extension. It is to be "constituted of workers and destined to preserve



order and the population's security." It has no assigned limit of numbers, nor is it part of the forces recognizing the authority of the Polish Government, for "the condition and order of organizing this militia will be stipulated during the examination of the treaty in detail." No great effort of the imagination is needed to foresee what stipulations victorious Bolshevism would make. Well may Mr. Lloyd George apprehend that the "civic militia" would eventually have been "moulded in the plan of the Russian Red Army." Only the wilfully blind can fail to discern the crafty intention of the Soviet leaders. Their pious recognition of Polish independence *was* and *is* a sham. They had planned to create an armed force of "workers," which should set up Red rule in Warsaw and spread ruin over the land. Poland should have freedom—but it should be measured in a Bolshevik bushel.

The speech of Mr. Lloyd George was on August 10th, 1920, and included the following sentences :

*It is not merely that we are morally bound to interest ourselves in the life of a nation which is an ally and to which we have undertaken to give support in the event of its national existence being challenged. There is, in addition, the danger which is involved to the "peace of Europe" if you have a great aggressive Soviet Empire conterminous with Germany. There are those who believe that the Soviet Republic is essentially a peaceful one. Let them believe it. But if in spite of every effort to make peace, if the Soviet Republic rejects conferences for the purpose, if it postpones them, if it introduces conditions which involve a practical annexation of another country, then, whatever the Soviet Republic was yesterday, to-day and to-morrow it will become an Imperialist militarist Power.*

The change in the military situation naturally affected the peace discussions, which were transferred to a neutral capital, Riga, where, eventually, a peace treaty was signed between Russia, Poland and the Ukraine on March 18th, 1921. The treaty was concluded in an atmosphere of amity, and the President of the Russian Peace Delegation, M. Joffe, voiced his country's satisfaction and absolute freedom of action in making this international agreement.

During the 1920's relations between Russia and Poland were uneasy at times, as they were in fact between Western Europe and Russia. However, they improved after 1930. On July 25th, 1932, Russians and Poles signed in Moscow a pact of non-aggression which declared in its preamble that "the Treaty of Peace of March 18th, 1921 (i.e. Riga), constitutes, now as in the past, the basis of their reciprocal relations and undertakings." Article I of the pact stated :

*The two Contracting Powers, recording the fact that they have renounced war as an instrument of national policy in their mutual relations, reciprocally undertake to refrain from taking aggressive action against or invading the territory of the other Party, either alone or in conjunction with other Powers.*

This pact was renewed in 1934, and its validity extended until December 31st, 1945. After the Moscow Pact, which occasioned the German

invasion of Poland from the West and the Russian attack from the East, and the consequent re-partition of Poland according to the Molotov-Ribbentrop plan, and after the German invasion of Russia on June 21st-22nd, 1941, a further agreement was made between the Governments of Russia and Poland, the text of which commenced in this manner :

The Government of the U.S.S.R. and the Government of the Republic of Poland have reached the following agreement :

- (1) The Government of the U.S.S.R. *recognizes the Soviet-German Treaties of 1939 as to territorial changes in Poland as having lost their validity.*

When this agreement had been reached in London, Mr. Eden handed to General Sikorski a note from the British Government, which included this assurance, that "His Majesty's Government does not recognize any territorial changes made in Poland since August, 1939." That is the treaty situation between Russia and Poland from 1921 to 1941. The charge that the Eastern frontier settlement was imposed upon an unwilling Russia or was retained against Russia's protests is seen to be as childish as it is unfair.

### (3) POLES IN THE EASTERN PROVINCES.

These provinces have, and have always had, a mixed population. That is true. Therefore, it may be argued that no purely ethnological solution is possible. For something like four centuries before the partitions (1772, 1793 and 1795) the people were under Polish rule and influenced by Polish culture. Between 1795 and 1917 they were subject to Russian rule, with the important exception of Eastern Galicia, that has never yet been under Russia.

As far as "racial" percentages go, a rough division can be taken from the Polish census of 1931. Dividing the provinces into four groups, running from North to South, the Northern group, round Wilno, has a majority of Poles. The districts of Wilno and Nowogródek, for instance, had, in 1931, a Polish proportion of 59.7 and 52.4 respectively. The city of Wilno, one of the most remarkable centres of Polish culture and religion, though originally it was the capital city of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, had : Poles, 69.0 per cent. ; Jews, 13.5 per cent. ; Lithuanians, 11.3 per cent. In the two intermediate groups, Polesia and Volhynia, the Poles are, racially, in an evident minority, their percentage varying, in Polesia from 24 to 7, and in Volhynia, from 27 to 11. The Southern group, i.e. Eastern Galicia, returned just under 40 per cent. Poles, and slightly over 50 per cent. Ukrainian. The city of Lwów, however, had 63 per cent. Poles, 23.7 per cent. Jews, and 12.1 per cent. Ukrainian. The population is therefore very mixed and has always been mixed. It was under Polish rule for centuries, and ethnologically, the Poles

can put forward the only strong claim. On this score, the Russian claim to these territories is ridiculous. Only one per cent. of the population is Russian, in the sense of "Great Russian," that is in the sense of the inhabitants of Russia proper. The non-Polish elements here are Slav, generally, either White Russians or Ukrainians.

But we have to consider here the religious as well as the racial question. The religious figures for these provinces are: Catholics (of both the Latin and the Uniat rites), 56.7; Orthodox, 31.7; Jews, 9.9. For Eastern Galicia, the corresponding data are: Catholics (again of both rites), 88.7 per cent.; Jews, 10.4 per cent. It is not without significance that in the debate in the House of Commons the religious question was practically untouched; nothing was said of the enormity of handing over to Soviet rule something like 12 million Christians, Catholic and Orthodox. The facile reply would of course be that the Soviet Government has now granted religious freedom. Well, let us hope that the reply has some value, that the measure of toleration granted is genuine and its granting more than a tactical move in time of war. Christian suspicion of Soviet "toleration" in religious matters is still profound, and will require the evidence of facts, certain facts, to dispel it. The attitude of the Orthodox in these provinces can be seen from a statement issued by two bishops of the Polish Orthodox Church, Bishop Sava of Grodno and, Bishop Mateusz, of Wilno. These two prelates have condemned the Crimea decisions with reference to Poland and declare that, in so doing, they are expressing the opinion of their Orthodox brethren and of the Orthodox Church in Poland:

In 1939, guided by Christian morality, we condemned in our Pastoral letters to the faithful the aggression of the Hitlerite forces. . . . So now we condemn the imposed activities of alien elements in Poland supported by foreign power. Even more do we condemn the international attempts to legalize this state of affairs. We declare that we, Orthodox citizens of Poland, remain faithful to the Polish State, which has been fighting the German invader since 1939, and to its constitutional Government, sitting for the time being in London. We raise our voices to advocate respect for Christian principles, rights and morals in international life.

These prelates are "non-Polish," in the racial sense; they are also, religiously, "non-Catholics"; yet they declare their heartfelt wish, as "non-Polish" and "non-Catholic" representatives, to remain in Poland's Eastern provinces under Polish rule; and they assert their conviction that they are speaking for their Orthodox brethren and for the Polish Orthodox Church.

#### (4) THE UKRAINIANS IN THE EASTERN PROVINCES.

Finally, it has been glibly assumed that the non-Polish elements in these provinces are either Russian or else anxious for incorporation in

Russia. The declaration of the two Orthodox bishops has already dispelled that assumption. These non-Polish peoples are not Russian at all, in the "Great Russian" sense; the majority are Ukrainians—borderers or frontiersmen (the word Ukraine means "frontier" and originally referred to the borderland between Russians, Poles, Turks and Tartars). After the association of Poland and Lithuania, which developed into an actual political union in 1569, the Western Ukrainians came under Poland's sway; they remained so until the partitions. There never was an independent Ukrainian State, with the sole exception of the community of Zaporogian Cossacks who managed to remain for some time outside the Polish and Russian spheres of influence.

In the nineteenth century a Ukrainian Nationalist movement did develop. It was middle-class, cultural as much as political (its patron the Uniat Archbishop of Lwów), and was largely fomented in Eastern Galicia by the Austrian authorities to counterbalance Polish predominance in Galicia and to create difficulties between the Ukrainians and Russia. The movement was anti-Russian even more than anti-Polish. After the collapse of Russia in 1917, experiments were made to form an autonomous Ukrainian State, which the Central Powers intended should be part of Austria-Hungary. January, 1919, saw the proclamation of an East Galician Ukrainian Republic which tried to unite with a similar Republic centred in Kiev, under the "Hetman" Petlura; together, they fought against Poles and against Bolsheviks, but later united with the Poles to continue a common struggle against the Red Armies. The Treaty of Riga, which made peace between Russia and Poland, dealt also with the Ukraine, and both parties recognized an independent Ukrainian Republic; Russia absorbed it eventually in July, 1923.

With regard to the Ukrainians in these Eastern provinces, the Poles accepted certain measures which they were very slow to fulfil. So much must be allowed. Some form of Home Rule was to be granted; a Ukrainian university established. It is only a partial defence to state that other Governments besides that of Poland were equally slow to treat minorities in the full spirit of promises made and obligations incurred; and to say that the situation began to improve considerably in the few years prior to 1939. It is only a partial defence to plead, as have the Poles, that any further loosening of the Polish State framework would have been exploited by unfriendly neighbours, to East and West. Yet, despite petitions from the Ukrainians to the League of Nations, the largest Ukrainian body, the Ukrainian National Democratic Party (U.N.D.O.), co-operated with the Government, and expressed its solidarity with the Poles at the outbreak of war. It was also represented in every Parliament after 1922, returned 15 members in the 1938 elections, and its leader, M. Mudrij, was Deputy Speaker in 1938-39. Most of the Ukrainian violence was stirred up by



the Ukrainian Nationalist Organization (O.U.N.)—a secret body, directed from Berlin by the U.W.O. (Ukrainian Military Organization)—and this revolutionary policy was repudiated both by the U.N.D.O. and by the Head of the Uniat Church.

Without pretending to solve the knotty problem of the Ukraine or to suggest that Polish-Ukrainian difficulties had been dealt with satisfactorily by 1939, I suggest that it is foolish to claim that Ukrainian-Russian relations have been any more friendly or more fortunate. *The Bulletin of International News*, for January 14th, 1939, had a special article on "The Ukrainian Problem," which contained the following paragraphs (here somewhat abbreviated) on the Russian policy towards the Ukraine Republic, incorporated in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics :

The post-war history of Russian Ukraine falls into three phases. During the first, up till 1923, the Bolshevik military occupation was accompanied by a policy of intense russification and exploitation of the peasantry ; this led to insurrections, deliberate reduction of agricultural output, and, finally, to the famines of 1921-22. During the second phase (1923-29) this policy was abandoned as a failure.

The third phase opened at the end of 1929 with the formulation of M. Stalin's "General Line of the Party," the initiation of the Five-Year plan, and the campaign for the collectivisation of peasant agriculture. It was marked by the increasing centralisation of administrative functions, as well as of the chief industrial and trust organizations, in Moscow ; the liquidation of the Ukrainian Autocephalous Church ; attacks on the Ukrainian intelligentsia ; and the breaking of peasant resistance to collectivisation—which culminated in the famine of 1933—through mass arrests and transportations. M. Postychev's appointment in 1933 to represent the Communist Party's Central Executive Committee in the Ukraine was followed by further arrests of intellectuals, the exposure of what was alleged to be a separatist plot fomented by German agents, a party purge, and the suicide of the Ukrainian Minister of Education, M. Skrypnyk, "in order to escape the consequences of anti-Soviet activity."

Further executions and purges, both of the Party and of the Army, took place in 1937 ; in March of that year M. Postychev himself was transferred to a minor post outside the Republic, while in September the Prime Minister, M. Lyubchenko—a Russian with an apparently blameless record—committed suicide from motives similar to those of M. Skrypnyk. Purges continued in the spring of 1938, and in June a number of high party officials were denounced and dismissed from their posts.

The same article mentions that the Ukrainian membership of the Communist Party fell from 600,000 in 1933, to 300,000 in 1936, while that of the Komsomols or Communist Youth Organization, fell from 720,000 in 1933, to 270,000 in 1936.

Critics of the Poles would have some difficulty in proving that the proper solution for the Ukrainian problem is the incorporation of all Ukrainians in Soviet Russia. Granted that there should have been



changes—a hypothesis by no means obvious and certainly not substantiated—these ought to have taken place, by means of free and unfettered elections, under international supervision, in the Eastern provinces of Poland, and through negotiations, mutual and untrammelled, between the Governments of Poland and of Russia. Both these obvious and democratic procedures have been passed over—to the dismay and detriment of Ukrainians and Poles, and to the disillusionment of many millions of people who for more than five years have hoped that from the ruin and the wreck of war there might arise a saner, more just, and more honourable order in the affairs of nations.

JOHN MURRAY.

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SHORT NOTICE

We can heartily recommend *Poland's Progress : 1919-1939* (John Murray : 10s. 6d. n.) to all who would like to have a more detailed notion of the very great advances made by the revived Polish State during the twenty years from 1919 to the outbreak of this war. The book is edited by Michael Murray who admits his affection for Poland and her people, but has not let that affection run away with him—at least here. Using hundreds of good—some of them excellent—photographs he shows the remarkable economic and industrial progress of the reborn State ; the manner in which some of its cities (Cracow, Lwów, Wilno, Poznan and Gdynia) were extended and developed ; the growth of social legislation and measures for recreation, sport and public health, as also the provisions for education and higher learning. There are interesting sections on Sports and Games and on Literature and the Arts. But there is one department of Polish national life which has been omitted, for practical purposes, from this book. I say “for practical purposes” for that may well be the reason for its omission. This department is the religious. The book contains a brief mention of the arrangements for religious education in schools but that is all. There are one or two photographs of religious monuments or pictures ; but they are included on artistic and not religious grounds. This is a pity for it is impossible to understand the Polish character or Poland's history without an appreciation of its profoundly Catholic background. This omission apart, the book is wholly admirable ; it shows, incidentally, how far ahead of Britain was Poland in some of its planned development. Our sincerest hopes are that the Poles will be restored at least to Western Poland, able to continue that work which flourished, as these details and illustrations so fully reveal, in the between-war years. Sir Ernest Barker, in a foreword, writes :

I saw many “Cavalier” things in Poland a dozen years ago—monuments of Sobieski ; trophies of the Turkish wars ; the gallantries and splendours of Polish kings and Polish nobles. Being an old teacher of history, I confess that I was fascinated by these things. But the abiding memory which I brought away was something different. It was a memory of the Polish people—a sober and hard-working people—soberly setting their house in order. It was a memory of industrial, educational, and medical effort, directed to laying the foundations of a healthy life, both of body and mind, for the whole of the people of Poland.

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## DEMOCRACY AND THE PARTY SYSTEM

**T**HERE is a striking contrast between the immense importance of the question of party for the future of the world and the comparative apathy of public opinion with regard to the principles involved. To-day all over Europe men are suffering and dying and being outlawed and liquidated for their membership or non-membership of a political party. Party has largely taken the place that religion took in the past. The persecutors and the persecuted are no longer men of religious faith, members of churches and sects, but men of political ideology, wearers of a party badge and shouters of a political slogan. We have seen the danger that this tendency may swallow up everything else, humanity and patriotism and reason, until the whole order of civilized life collapses in barbarism. On the other hand it is so easy to see the enormous evils produced by the spirit of party, the party system has always had such a bad press, that there is a danger of going too far in the opposite direction and forgetting that without some kind of party system democratic government becomes almost impossible. And not democratic government alone—for party is equally characteristic of the older type of aristocratic state and of the new type of totalitarian democracy. Indeed to-day only a few rare survivors of the older style of non-party state exist in the most remote parts of Asia. No doubt it is theoretically possible to conceive a democracy without parties, after the fashion of the old Swiss democracy of the original Forest Cantons. But this is so remote from practical politics that we can afford to ignore it. The size and power and complicated mechanism of the modern state demand an equally high standard of political organization, and this involves in practice not only a highly organized civil service but also a highly organized party system. The real issue is therefore not that of party or no party, but that of the totalitarian versus the non-totalitarian party, or the single party versus the multiple party system. And these questions are very important and very urgent. In fact all our political institutions and perhaps even our very national existence depend on whether it is possible to maintain the non-totalitarian party system under modern conditions.

At first sight this may seem a surprising statement, for one might suppose that if party is inevitable, a single party would fulfil its function more economically and more efficiently than a number of rival parties which must inevitably cause political and social conflict. But if we consider the implications of a single party we shall soon see that much

more is at stake than a mere question of relative efficiency. A single party means a monopoly of political power. It means that no change of government or policy is possible except by the will of the party that already controls the government or is controlled by it. It means that no organized criticism of the government is possible and that the rights of individuals or co-operatives or private associations are all dependent on this single centre of power. The fact is that the single party presupposes an entirely different political ideal and an entirely different type of state from that involved in the free or multiple party system. It may be a democratic state if we understand democracy in Rousseau's sense of a state in which the General Will is supreme, but it is a different form of democracy from that which has been developed in this country and in America as a result of the toleration and even encouragement of the opinions and interests of minorities—so different, indeed, that the use of the same term for the two political traditions is equivocal and misleading. The single party state, whether it embodies the will of the people or the usurped authority of some minority, belongs to the same political genus as the absolute monarchy. It is absolutism in modern dress and as a rule this is made perfectly obvious by the fact that the single party state is almost invariably a dictatorship.

On the other hand all those states which admit the existence of more than one party belong to the same political genus, whether they are democratic or non-democratic in regard to the franchise and to the control of the executive by the elected representatives of the people.

This is not merely a question of the political structure of the state, but it also affects its social form and its spiritual character. If a state admits the existence of constitutional opposition to the government, it also tends almost inevitably to encourage freedom of discussion and the free expression of opinion, even where, as in 18th century England, the opposition itself formed part of a privileged minority. Actually the type of democracy which developed in Britain and America, as well as many of the smaller countries of Western Europe, has been based not on the solidarity of the general will, but on the rights of minorities, the freedom of minority opinion and the existence of a constitutional opposition. These are the hallmarks of the particular type of state which was developed in this country and in America from the 18th century onwards, and when the English-speaking peoples talk of democracy or the democratic way of life or the Four Freedoms, they are thinking primarily and perhaps exclusively of this kind of state. In a democracy of this kind the party system plays an essential rôle, for it is the function of party to organize political opinion in such a way as to have a direct and effective influence on the conduct of government. It does this in two ways—first by providing an organ of opposition which subjects the government to a continuous process of examination and criticism, and secondly by building up an

alternative government which will take over the reins of power as soon as it has rallied a sufficient majority of the electorate to its support. These functions can be fulfilled most adequately and economically when there are only two parties, and in fact we find in the countries where this type of democracy has been developed—in Britain and America—that there has always been a tendency towards a two party system. But this does not exclude considerable diversities within the party. In fact in this country, the two party system has developed on the lines of two rival coalitions of political groups rather than as two highly organized ideological units. Indeed it may be argued that the ideological factor has been only of secondary importance in the Anglo-American party system, so that the two great American parties have been described as empty bottles into which any wine could be poured so long as the labels were not changed. This is actually desirable inasmuch as the more fluid the party line, the more capable it is of receiving the changing currents of public opinion. A strictly ideological party is a strait waistcoat which forces public opinion into its own pattern. Hence it is better in principle that the ideological group should be distinct from the political party. In fact the former has usually been most effective when it had no direct political responsibilities, as in the case of the Fabian Society or the Philosophic Radicals, whereas the Doctrinaires in early 19th century France forfeited much of the influence they might have exercised by their premature acquisition of political power.

In the same way, the democratic party should not have a class basis, for this also tends to make party division too rigid and their opposition too extreme. If the parties really represent different social classes, every election becomes a kind of class war, and the changes of government which should be normal incidents of democratic politics acquire a quasi revolutionary character. For the parliamentary party is not a communal unit like the totalitarian party, it is a political mechanism to ensure the free expression of public opinion and the even distribution of political power. It is essentially a limited and subordinate organization, and the moment that it oversteps its limit and aspires to become a complete and self-sufficient social unit, it defeats the purpose for which it exists. This limitation of the function of party is obviously a difficult condition which is only possible in a society which possesses considerable political experience and a tradition of social unity and co-operation. Where these conditions do not exist, parliamentary democracy has proved incapable of maintaining itself against the single party state which is its most formidable rival.

This is the crucial political issue of our time, but though it has assumed a new form, it has a long history behind it. In fact the first democratic state to make its appearance in modern times was not a democracy of the true parliamentary type. It was the single party dictatorship of the First French Republic—a régime which



in spite of its short existence had a profound effect on European history and on modern political thought. During its brief career the Jacobin republic developed all the characteristic features which have become so familiar in the totalitarian states of our own times: the party ideology and the party slogan, the party purge (*épuration*), the liquidation of opposite groups, the use of intimidation and terror as political weapons and the exclusion from political rights of classes and individuals that were regarded as socially or ideologically unreliable. Above all, it developed the technique by which a minority which claimed to represent the general will imposed itself on the majority by an organized system of propaganda and the formation of an artificial public opinion by the suppression of all opposition views. Naturally enough this system provoked the most intense hostility not only from the supporters of the old régime but from the liberals who had been the dominant element in the Constituent Assembly. What is more remarkable is that they did not underestimate its possibilities. Its bitterest opponents, like Burke and Mallet du Pan and de Maistre, were the first to recognize the immense increase of energy and power produced by the concentration of all the reserves of society in the solid mass of a democratic single party state: a battering ram with twenty million wills behind it, in de Maistre's expressive phrase.

The tradition of the Jacobin republic survived in two different forms. On the one hand it produced the plebiscitary dictatorship of Napoleon and the 19th century ideal of democratic imperialism. On the other, the memory of the French Revolution survived in the underground world of the revolutionary agitators and idealists—in groups like the Society of the Equals, the Carbonari, the Society of the Rights of Man and the League of the Just. Here it became a cult and a legend and inspired not only the republican parties but also the earliest socialist movements in France and Germany. With men like Buonarrotti and Blanqui and later with Bakunin, and even to some extent with Proudhon and Marx, revolution became an end in itself, a creative act which would give birth to a new world in blood and fire. To such men the Anglo-American tradition of constitutionalism and legal rights was supremely distasteful, and the pattern of democratic action was found not in parliamentarism but in the Parisian Commune of 1871 which in its turn, like the Commune of 1793, became a legend and an ideal.

Now it is obvious that revolutionary democracy of this type must necessarily assume a totalitarian character. Revolution is social war: it leaves no time for discussion and no room for party division within the revolutionary ranks. It demands fanaticism, discipline and unity of direction. And even if the revolution is successful, it will be necessary to maintain this unity of direction, whether in the form of a personal dictatorship or the class dictatorship of the proletariat, until the new social system is completely established.

But though the revolutionary democrats were totalitarian they were no friends of the state. "We deny the government of the state," wrote Proudhon, "because we affirm the personality and the autonomy of the masses"—and this attitude is characteristic in varying degrees of all the social revolutionaries of the 19th century, from Bakunin, who said that he had two *bêtes noires*—the State and the Church—to Marx and Engels who believed that the State would automatically "wither away" in proportion as the new socialist order was realized.

Meanwhile, however, parliamentary democracy was going from strength to strength until by the beginning of the present century it seemed destined to become universally accepted as the only normal form of government in modern states. But it was less firmly established than it seemed, and the moment of its apparent triumph, when the Western democracies defeated the military powers of Central Europe and established the League of Nations, actually marked the turn of the tide. From that time the single party state has steadily grown in importance, if not in popularity, and parliamentary democracy has steadily declined. The tendency is closely associated with the rise of Fascism with which it is often identified. But it is in fact a much wider movement. It found its first and most far-reaching expression in Communist Russia where it was based on a strictly Marxian ideology interpreted by a great political realist, and it has also deeply influenced the national movements in the Near and Far East which are neither Fascist nor Communist.

No doubt a great deal of this advance of the single party state is to be explained by the sudden conversion to democratic and nationalist ideals of peoples which have been accustomed for ages to autocratic forms of government, for as I remarked in the beginning, the single party state is a kind of democratic absolutism. But this is not the whole explanation, since parliamentary democracy has also lost ground in the West, even in countries which had considerable experience of representative institutions. To some extent this has been due to infection from outside by totalitarian propaganda, but this could hardly have been successful had there not been elements of disintegration already present in Western democracy. On the one hand the Marxian criticism of parliamentary democracy as a hollow facade to mask the class domination of the bourgeoisie alienated the sympathies of the workers and the socialist parties, while on the other hand the leaders of Western culture became increasingly sceptical of the moral values and the rational principles which had originally been the common ground that united all the democratic parties. These tendencies to disintegration were increased by the introduction of proportional representation and the multiplication of minority groups which reduced the art of democratic government to a complicated manipulation of shifting coalitions. We have seen how the totalitarian parties were able to exploit this situation so as to make democratic

government impossible, and finally to solve the deadlock they had created by a plebiscitary appeal to the will of the people, backed by the violence of an armed minority. At the present time, though the direct threat to Western democracy by the Fascist parties has been defeated, the situation of parliamentary democracy on the continent of Europe remains extremely precarious. We see on the one hand numerous but weak democratic parties attempting to recover their former constitutional leadership, and on the other powerful armed groups which seek to impose their will on the nation by revolutionary violence. Such a situation is only too favourable to the development of new forms of totalitarianism and dictatorship. In any case it is not possible to combine the two types of party in a single state, any more than you can keep rabbits and ferrets in the same cage.

The first condition for any kind of parliamentary democracy is that Freedom from Fear which President Roosevelt once declared to be one of the essential bases of world order. So long as men are liable to be shot for their opinions, so long as minority groups are liable to be decimated or deported, there can be no room for free discussion or free political institutions. But without these things Western democracy loses its character and its distinctive values, since there is as wide a gulf between the two rival forms of democracy as there can be between any two political systems whatsoever. The experience of the last thirty years has shown how difficult it is to introduce parliamentary institutions into countries which have no traditions of political freedom. It is impossible to maintain the right of political opposition where this right is only understood in terms of civil war. The parliamentary party system involves the toleration of our opponents, as well as freedom to express our own views. For the parties are necessary to one another as complementary organs of the democratic state, instead of being the exclusive embodiment of that state as in the totalitarian system.

But though we now realize that the tradition of freedom and material toleration is a much rarer and more delicate plant than we believed in the past, nothing in the experience of the last thirty years has diminished its inherent value and importance, and nothing can excuse the blind and cynical indifference which gambles away the greatest political inheritance in the world in the vain attempt to appease totalitarian opinion either in this country or elsewhere.

In order to preserve this tradition of political freedom it is not enough to pay lip service to vague ideals of Democracy and Equality and Liberty, which have completely different and even contradictory meanings in the two types of state. We must make it perfectly clear to the man in the street what we are fighting for and what are the minimal conditions under which parliamentary democracy can exist. On the one hand it is necessary to preserve the freedom of opinion and the constitutional rights of minorities ; but on the other, it is

even more important to maintain the self-imposed discipline of civil society which is the foundation alike of Western democracy and of Western culture. For the most fundamental political alternative is that between the state which is conceived as a scientific power organization and the state which is the embodiment of a common law founded on the will and the conscience of the individual citizen. The single party system inevitably favours the former, while parliamentary democracy can never be permanently successful except in a state of the second type. But such a state cannot be created by majority decision or by the fiat of political power. It rests on foundations that are beyond politics, principles of the moral order and the forces of spiritual tradition. The restoration of these foundations is the greatest problem of modern civilization, but it is a spiritual problem that can only be solved by spiritual means. But if this task is beyond the powers and outside the province of the political leader, it is at least his duty to recognize the importance of spiritual values, and to do nothing to weaken the foundations on which the stability of his own work depends. As the Christian state of the Middle Ages demanded the limitation of the king by law, and the independence of the spiritual power of which he was the servant rather than the master, so the Western tradition of democracy involves the self-limitation of governments and parties and majorities under the rule of law and the recognition of a super-political order which has its autonomous values that may not be disregarded or overridden for any political end. No doubt in practice the state will sacrifice anything when its survival is at stake in times of war and revolution, and for that reason the world has always been full of despotism and servitude, but it has been the ideal of Western civilization to push back the frontiers of necessity and to widen the sphere of freedom, so that the state is not merely a necessary evil, a guarantee of bare existence, but a society for realising a good life. The Western parliamentary democracy has been the last and most elaborate expression of this ideal. The question that we now have to face is whether this highly developed type of state can be maintained and extended or whether it is destined to succumb to a coarser but stronger power, as the Greek city state succumbed to Macedonian military despotism.

CHRISTOPHER DAWSON.

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#### EDITORIAL NOTE

All contributions submitted to the Editor must be typed and be accompanied by a sufficiently large stamped addressed envelope—stamps (or Post Office coupons from abroad) alone will not suffice. Articles so submitted should be concerned with matters of general interest, and be the fruit of expert knowledge or original research. They should not ordinarily exceed 3,000 words, and must be intended for exclusive publication in the "Month," if accepted.

Literary Communications, Exchanges, and Books for Review should be addressed to The Editor of "The Month," 114 Mount Street, London, W.1, and not to the Publishers: Business Communications to The Manager, Manresa Press, Roehampton, London, S.W.15.



# MISCELLANEA

## I. CRITICAL AND HISTORICAL NOTES

### THE BIBLE AND SCIENCE

THE latest treatise on this subject is from the pen of Fr. James, Ph.D., and comes from South Africa under the title "Can we Harmonise the Bible with Science?"<sup>1</sup> The author was a pupil of Professor Goebel and has published work on the mosses and also on the diluvial question in South Africa. It is much to be regretted that very imperfect proof-reading makes an unfavourable impression. We read of Father Wasmann, p. 10, and three times of Father Wasman on p. 30. Well-known names appear as Aristotele, p. 8, Herodot, p. 70; Hobbes' date appears as 1588-1769; de Vries is said, p. 27, to be mentioned in the first chapter, but correctly, p. 32, in the Preface; the Permian period is classed as Mesozoic on p. 57, as Palæozoic on p. 85. Any typewriter can be guilty of these and similar blemishes, but the author who allows them to appear in numbers in his printed work does an injustice to it and to himself.

His interpretation of the first chapter of Genesis is presented by the author as a revised Vision Theory. This theory distinguishes between the six days and what may be called the content of the days. The vision is taken to have lasted for six days and the visionary, who was conscious of these changes of day and night, records what was revealed to him separately on each day. The different revelations are supposed to correspond to objective reality. The theory might, therefore, be more fully described as the factual vision or concordistic vision theory. The divisions of time have nothing to do with the cosmogony but merely measure the stages of the revelation; the content of the vision is supposed to give facts which are in agreement with the actual formation of the world. The theory has one obvious advantage. It understands the days in their plain sense of periods of twenty-four hours and at the same time disconnects them from the cosmogony. That the author of Genesis meant days of twenty-four hours seems obvious from his ascribing to each an evening and a morning and from his equation of the evening and morning of the first day to the period of darkness which preceded the creation of light and the subsequent period after its creation. A writer who had long eras of time in mind would not have spoken of their having each an evening and a morning. The Mosaic enumeration of the parts of the day in the order of evening and morning is in accordance with the Hebrew manner of computation according to which the day of twenty-four hours was reckoned to begin in the evening, not, as Dr. James suggests, p. 38, in the morning.

But does this idea of Genesis, chap I, relating the content of a vision, rest on any solid ground? Certainly the chapter makes no mention of a vision nor, indeed, of any direct revelation; and the only ground for the view in question would seem to be that revelations were often made in visions. If it could be established, therefore, that the substance of the chapter is the record of a revelation, there would be some plausibility in suggesting a vision

<sup>1</sup> Published by St. Francis Mission, P.O. Mahlabathini, Zululand. The book, pp. xii+95, is dated 1941, but reached us only towards the close of 1944. Price not stated.

as the means employed for its communication ; but, as we shall see, the evidence is all against the suggestion that the manner of the formation and peopling of the earth was the subject of a revelation. And, if this is the case, there does not appear to be any plausibility in the suggestion of a vision. In any case, even if there were a vision, why should the extraneous element of the length of the vision be introduced without any clear distinction in the text between what belonged to the vision and what belonged to its substance ? The mention of the time divisions seems obviously to imply that they are time divisions of the divine activity, not time divisions of the seer's vision. Generations of readers from St. Gregory of Nyssa and St. Augustine have understood the days to refer to God's work, as, indeed, was only natural, seeing that there is no mention of any vision in the text.

It is time to turn from a consideration of the supposed vision to that of what the vision is said to have revealed. The author's explanation is such as might be given by anyone who wishes to see in the opening cosmogony of Genesis a faithful record of what actually happened, by anyone, that is, who wishes to establish a harmony between the first chapter of Genesis and the findings of modern science. The only difference between the author's view and what is commonly called the "concordistic" interpretation is that the author by his vision theory eliminates the days from the elements which have to be harmonised with science.

In the first place, is it reasonable to expect in the Mosaic cosmogony, an account which anticipates the findings of modern science ? We assume, of course, that the verdict of modern science is correct, for that is the assumption at the base of all attempts to demonstrate the existence of harmony between Genesis and science. If we eliminate pure chance, which no one would suggest, there are only two ways in which the Mosaic cosmogony could have given an account in agreement with the actual facts. These two ways are by reason and by revelation. The first way may be dismissed since no one will imagine the author to have anticipated the discoveries of long subsequent generations of scientists down to our own century by the use of his own powers of investigation. This leaves only the way of revelation. Now, St. Augustine laid down long ago the principle that God does not reveal in Scripture the secrets of nature, the knowledge of which does not help man to save his immortal soul. And this principle of St. Augustine's, which, so to say, bears on its face the stamp of truth, has been made his own by Pope Leo XIII in *Providentissimus Deus*, his great Encyclical on biblical studies. On such matters, the Pope says, God allowed the sacred writers to speak according to appearances and according to the manner of speech current in their day. This papal teaching makes it plain that we must not look in the pages of the Bible for any science other than the science of the time when the different biblical books were written. This papal teaching, moreover, warns us that no attempt to find modern science on the opening page of the Bible will be successful. Nonetheless, it will be of some interest briefly to follow our author in his well-meant effort to show that the findings of modern science are actually enshrined in the first chapter of Genesis.

The Mosaic age fell in the second half of the second millennium B.C., when science was still in its infancy. Men had not yet come to understand that the light of our day is wholly due to the sun. This seems obvious to us, but a little reflection shows that this truth had to be won and is by no means self-evident. To the untrained mind the contrary seems to be the case, as there is light even when the sun is overcast and entirely invisible.

Hence we find that the Mosaic cosmogony has three days with light before the creation of the sun. Then what was the primitive conception of rain? Rain falls on the earth as a liquid, and early man had no idea of evaporation, condensation, and the water-carrying power of the clouds. A simple scientific explanation of the facts of experience was that there exists above a reservoir, a supra-mundane supply of water. What holds this up in position? The most obvious answer was that it rested on the solid firmament which we seem to see above us. Then immediately arises the question, how can this water fall down on the earth in the form of rain? The scientific hypothesis which solved this problem satisfactorily for a time, was that in the solid firmament there are apertures or sluices, which can be shut and opened at suitable times. For its day this was a satisfying and even convincing theory. Accordingly we read that on the second day God created a firmament and divided the upper waters, those, namely, above the firmament, from the lower waters, those, namely on the earth. The heavenly bodies being visible to man must be under the firmament and, indeed, appear to move on its under surface. Accordingly after the creation of the firmament we read that God said "Let there be lights made in the firmament of heaven."

Vegetation was made on the second day when the dry land appeared. Being rooted in the soil and without motion the trees and plants are treated as practically forming one with the land on which they grow. Together with it they make the habitat of animals and men. So their creation was part of the work of the first three days, in which regions or homes were prepared for their future populations. The second three days saw the creation of these populations, both inanimate and animate. On the fourth day the firmament received its heavenly bodies, the sun, moon, and stars. On the fifth day the air and the waters were peopled with birds and aquatic creatures. On the sixth and last day the earth became the home of the populations it had been prepared for, namely the animals and man. Now was remedied the initial state of the earth which had been waste and void, bare, that is, of trees and other vegetation and empty of inhabitants.

How is this understood by our author? On the first day he supposes the earth already separated from its parent sun, and the divine command, "Let there be light," is taken to mean that the light finally penetrated the heavy clouds of gases that covered the seething globe. The upper waters mentioned on the second day turn out to stand for "a permanently dull and misty sky." The sea animals were already there (this day harmonises with the first Palæozoicum), but they are not mentioned "because they were not clearly visible." The divine command of the fourth day, "Let there be lights in the firmament of heaven," means that "in the first Triassic desert, probably thousands of miles away from the mist-belt of the ocean, appeared for the first time in the history of our earth the blue sky, the sun, the moon and the stars." The fifth day is said to be in agreement with the Mesozoicum. The animals that had existed in the previous Devonian and Carboniferous periods are not mentioned as not possessing "any striking features worthy of mention by the visionary." More surprising is it that though this fifth day is said in the Bible to have seen only the production of the sea and air animals, nonetheless in the period to which it is said to correspond, there flourished the Dinosauria. Some of these, the author tells us, "seventy feet long and twenty-five feet in height, were the largest animals which have ever existed on land" (p. 44). Here at

any rate it can hardly be suggested that these terrestrial animals were not in possession of "any striking features worthy of mention by the visionary." Yet he reserves mention of the creation of land animals for the sixth and last day.

Our discussion leads to the conclusion, firstly, that we have no reason for expecting to find in the Bible an account of the secrets of nature which corresponds with the true findings of science, and, secondly, that such an account cannot be found in the first chapter of Genesis. Moreover the notion that the Mosaic cosmogony must correspond to actual fact has led to this opening chapter of the Bible being interpreted in different ways according to the views prevailing in the different centuries as to what the actual history of the world has been. These views have varied considerably in the past; and who knows whether the science of the future will acknowledge the truth of the opinions prevailing to-day? It does not accord with the dignity of Scripture that its meaning should be made to change with the centuries in order to suit the passing theories of contemporary science. The path indicated by Leo XIII leads to a saner view of the Bible and one more in harmony with its dignity. In all matters of scientific knowledge God Almighty allowed the human authors of Scripture to speak as men of their time spoke. And it is no new opinion in the Church that Moses did not intend to give an objectively accurate account of the early history of the world. St. Athanasius and St. Augustine held that all things were created together at the same time, though, of course, they were entirely familiar with the Mosaic account.

Moses wished to bring home to his Hebrew contemporaries that God is the one and only supreme Lord and Master of the universe. They were prone to polytheism and his lesson had to be emphasised strongly. It would not have suited his purpose merely to say that God created all things. The lesson had to be driven home by the enumeration of the various classes of beings in the world. Especially were men of the time inclined to deify the heavenly bodies as did the contemporary Babylonians and Assyrians. Moses shows that they are the handiwork of God and subserve His purposes as do all other creatures. He stresses not only the uniqueness of God, but also His sublime omnipotence in that His mere word sufficed for the carrying out of His will and the creation of the most marvellous beings. That he omitted mention of the Angels is explained by St. Cyril of Alexandria as due to the crass mentality of his people who were not yet able to understand anything so subtle as the nature of spiritual beings. The chapter is, moreover, in clear condemnation of the view that matter is in itself evil. Not only are all things made by the one omnipotent God, but it is stressed by repetition that He was pleased with His work. Again and again it is said that He saw that it was good.

Moses, therefore, in his exposition of his main thesis that God created all things, incidentally included other important points of doctrine. But how are we to explain that he divided the divine activity over a period of six days? It seems clear that his purpose was to provide an exemplar for the duty of man to limit his work to six days and to rest on the seventh. It may be objected that such a method of procedure is highly artificial and quite alien to our manner of thinking and speaking. This is no doubt true and brings us up against one of the chief difficulties in interpreting the Bible correctly, a difficulty stressed by the present Pope in his biblical Encyclical, *Divino Afflante Spiritu*. This difficulty is precisely that God used human agents to write the sacred books and allowed them to use all



the manners of thought and speech common in their age. Now these writers were not only of an ancient time but belonged to an oriental people whose psychological make-up was very different from our own ; and it is no easy task to bring oneself to think as they thought and to see things in the light in which they saw them. But on success in this task must depend success in understanding aright the meaning that they wished to convey. Let me illustrate by an example from the more recent writing of St. Matthew. In his first chapter this Evangelist gives the genealogy of our Lord. This he divides into three sections, the first extending from Abraham to David, the second from David to the Babylonian captivity, the third from that time to Christ. Between Joram and Ozias (also called Azarias) St. Matthew omits three generations, Ochozias, Joas, and Amasias. In spite of these omissions he says that Joram begot Ozias. This, of course, is correct, as Joram begot him mediately through his descendants, whose names are omitted ; but such a manner of speaking is quite alien to ours, and if we had not the record of the Books of Kings to inform us of the actual line of descent, we could hardly have failed to suppose that Joram was the father of Ozias in the literal sense. This will prepare us for what is even more alien to our way of thinking and speaking. St. Matthew finds in each section of his genealogy fourteen generations : " So all the generations from Abraham to David are fourteen generations ; and from David to the transmigration of Babylon are fourteen generations ; and from the transmigration of Babylon to Christ are fourteen generations " (I, 17). Now, if a modern writer were to say that from David to the transmigration of Babylon there were fourteen generations, he would mean and we should understand him to mean that there were fourteen generations, no more and no less. But that is not the sense in which the Evangelist speaks. He is satisfied if there are fourteen at least. And the matter could be illustrated from other passages. The point to realise is how very different are the literary types found in the Bible from those to which we are accustomed in modern books. In view of the usage just illustrated from St. Matthew is it surprising that another writer of his race should divide the divine work of creation into six days followed by the seventh day of divine rest as an exemplar of the Sabbath ? Moses says that " God . . . rested on the seventh day " (Gen. 2, 2), though it is and was evident that there could not literally be question of resting for God, who had achieved all by the word of His command.

EDMUND F. SUTCLIFFE.

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#### SHORT NOTICE

Father James P. Cassidy has written a number of Saints' lives. His latest volume is **St. Francis de Sales** (M. H. Gill, Dublin : 3s. 6d. n.). It is a simple, yet quite adequate, account of a remarkable life. The saint's interior development and exterior activity are brought together in a narrative, lucidly composed and presenting a clear picture of its subject. Francis de Sales was an apostle ; we need that apostolic spirit to-day. He was a humanist and man of humour ; we sadly lack the quality of Christian tolerance in our war-harried world. He has been made, here in England, the patron of the Catholic Press ; that press has a message to deliver, more cogently than ever, in a country of religiously bemused and bewildered minds. St. Francis de Sales is a saint we would do well to study to-day. Father Cassidy's biography makes a suitable introduction.

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## II. OUR CONTEMPORARIES

- AMERICA :** February 3rd, 1945. **The Spiritual Basis of Holland's Resistance**, by L. Bleijs, C.S.S.R. [Shows how the Dutch resistance movement was inspired by Christian motives and controlled by Christian leaders, lay and ecclesiastical.]
- BLACKFRIARS :** March, 1945. **The Dominicans**. [This number is devoted to a series of articles on "Aspects of the Order of Friars Preachers," contributed by Dominican Fathers.]
- CATHOLIC MISSIONS :** January-February, 1945. **Korea and Christianity**. [A feature article on the development of the Church in Korea, from the Jesuit missionaries of the late sixteenth century, through the nineteenth century persecutions, to the present-day activity of the Maryknoll priests and the Foreign Mission Society of St. Columban.]
- COMMONWEAL :** February 16th, 1945. **Peace through Democracy**, by Thomas P. Neill. [Has a careful analysis of the Holy Father's allocution on Christmas Eve, 1944, with its emphasis on sound democracy, in which "the people are alive intellectually and morally, are genuinely free and independent, and rule themselves through a Government which they remain free to guide and criticize."]
- ETUDES :** January-March, 1945. **Journal de la Conscience Française**, by Gaston Fessard, S.J. [A hearty welcome to our French contemporary which reappears after four years of enforced silence under the German occupation. Among many interesting articles is a delicate study of the French mental and psychological reactions to the Government of Vichy and the various movements of resistance.]
- IRISH ECCLESIASTICAL RECORD :** March, 1945. **Ireland's Debt to Newman**, by Rev. W. J. Hegarty, C.C. [Father Hegarty commemorates the six years (1852-58) which Cardinal Newman spent in Ireland, discusses his hopes and difficulties, his relations with Dr. MacHale and Dr. Cullen, and the genesis of "The Idea of a University".]
- SIGN :** February, 1945. **The Soviet in Latin America**, by Richard Pattee. [An illuminating study of Soviet influence in the Latin American States, which exploits fear of the United States, points to the cultural advances in Russia, and prepares markets for post-war commerce.]
- STUDIES :** March, 1945. **What is Man?** by Joseph E. Canavan, S.J. [A history of men's idea of "Man"—first "Man" as God-related, then "Man," installed in place of God, "Man," the emancipated, the individualist, and finally, "Man," as he loses himself in the twentieth century collective mass.]
- SWORD OF THE SPIRIT :** March, 1945. **Yugoslavia**, by "Dacius." [An excellent booklet, which unravels—neatly and skilfully—the tangled skein of Balkan history and Balkan politics, and provides a valuable background against which to read the day-to-day news from Yugoslavia.]
- TABLET :** March 17th, 1945. **Russia and the Church in Eastern Europe**. [A balanced editorial which weighs the news that reaches us from countries in East Central Europe and the Balkans, and examines the Russian attitude towards Polish Catholics.]
- THOUGHT :** December, 1944. **Austrian Independence**, by George M. von Alexich. [The author pleads for a post-war economic union between Austria, Hungary, Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia, to which Austria could make a spiritual as well as an economic contribution.]

## REVIEWS

### MORE NEW WORLDS FOR OLD<sup>1</sup>

THE spate of books and pamphlets on the coming Post-war Settlement is already such as well-nigh to submerge any serious student who tries to keep pace with it. One can but hope it will not be as last time, when, only a few years after the war, you could find most of them in the sixpenny boxes of secondhand bookshops. But this one, at all events, will not share that fate. The chapter alone on "My Mission to Europe in 1940" would make it a best-seller.

The first part of the book takes us from 1918 to the change in United States policy from defensive to offensive. The second part analyses the chief international problems facing The Americas to-day: the German Neighbour Policy, the Near and Far East, the Soviet Union, and Germany. Part three contains Sumner Welles' "testament," his own blue-print for world organisation and his call to Americans in support of it.

He ascribes the failure of the League era partly to inherent impossibilities in the Treaty of Versailles itself, as "neither a negotiated peace nor a peace by imposition . . . a combination of the two alternatives was neither workable nor realistic"; partly to the refusal of the statesmen to trust the new League with any real work in the first few years; partly to the defection of his own country; partly to the sheer mockery of "Open Covenants"; partly to the Allied failure to meet the Russian Revolution in any constructive way at all; but chiefly (so far as the United States went) for lack of a real public opinion. "In a democracy such as ours the people must be kept fully and continuously informed. Except by the President they were not so informed. . . . Only an enlightened public opinion can be held responsible for its mistakes." (He is less keen on this final sentence, incidentally, when he comes to the future of Germany).

It is against this diagnostic background that he judges Locarno as encouraging the facile belief that Stresemann's Germany had "changed her spots," and the Briand-Kellogg Pact as marking "a high point in isolationist thinking in this country." The last possible moment for averting the present war was, he claims, the occasion of the President's Chicago speech on Armistice Day, 1937:

By sounding the British Government in this manner the President was now confronted with a positive warning that British support for his proposals would not be forthcoming. It has always been my conviction that, had the President not been advised to make these preliminary confidential soundings, and had he carried out his original idea of a world-wide appeal on Armistice Day of 1937, neither the British Government nor the Axis powers could then have refused, under the pressure of circumstances and public opinion, to lend at least co-operation.

His famous mission to Europe finally convinced Sumner Welles that

<sup>1</sup> *The Time for Decision*, by Sumner Welles. New York: Harpers, and London: Hamish Hamilton: Pp. x, 431. Price, 15s. n. 1944.

the war the President had been unable to avert could not now be prevented ("phoney" or not at the time) from running its course. We have here the details of his interviews with the chief actors, from his arrival at Rome on February 25th, to his final departure, after a tour of all the capitals, on March 19th. It is a terrific revelation so far as it concerns German and Italian policy: from the fanatical Anglophobia of von Ribbentrop (always at Hitler's elbow), via the grim fatalism of Mussolini, to the frank distaste for the war shown by Ciano both morally and tactically. Here is a typical gem. It is Ciano speaking:

Do you further realise that Hitler called me on the telephone only on August 21st last to announce the conclusion of this alliance (the Russian-German Treaty of August 23rd), and that before I had even had time to get Mussolini on the telephone to break the news to him, this very radio in my own room here was carrying the report broadcast to the whole world? *That* was the way in which Italy was advised as to German foreign policy.

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Mr. Sumner Welles is much less forthcoming on the details of his talks in London and Paris. Perhaps it is impossible to hope for objectivity so early in the historical writing of that year. His visit to the Pope is more cryptic than any other section. Since the passage is short and compact, Catholic readers may be glad to have it is full:

While I was awaiting such final word of the outcome of the meeting at the Brenner Pass as the Italian Government was disposed to give me, I was received by Pope Pius XII at the Vatican. Subsequently, I was afforded the opportunity of talking with Cardinal Maglione, the Cardinal Secretary of State. The detailed and accurate knowledge of the Holy See of conditions in every part of the world, particularly in the countries of Europe, is proverbial. What is perhaps not so well recognized is the quality of statesmanship which, at least in recent years, has distinguished the Vatican's policy.

Pope Pius XII possesses that quality in high degree. I found him profoundly saddened by the future he saw shaping so inevitably, and profoundly grieved by the barbarous inhumanity in so many regions of the world. It is, of course, impossible for me to give any indication of the nature of these conversations or of the views expressed to me. I can however state that I left the Vatican with the conviction that one of the constructive forces working for the regeneration of mankind will be the present Pope and many of those about him.

Next to this chapter, the most fascinating pages are those in which, during and after the crisis that brought the United States into the war, transcontinental arrangements were able to be made with complete secrecy. The high light here is the preparations for the North African invasion as a prelude to the Italian campaign. Those who have been inclined to write off Mr. Robert Murphy as a liability, because he was American Minister to Vichy, have now had their refutation. Sumner Welles shows (as the quotations in the *Tablet* of September 23rd, 1944, revealed), that Roosevelt's great care not to invoke a rupture of relations with Vichy was vitally necessary—to enable Murphy to maintain contact with the Resistance leaders in France and North Africa for the purpose of the coming landings in Algeria.



The five chapters that make up Part Two are models of historical diagnosis and political prospecting. He burkes no difficulty, whether it is a matter of Japanese enemies or Russian Allies. He is naïve at times, as over the anti-religious education campaign in the Soviet Union ("both efforts proved futile and were slowly abandoned!"); but he draws a realistic and sharp distinction between the two alternative outcomes of Soviet foreign policy—a regional system used for imposing protectorates, which the U.S.A. would dislike as unmistakably expansionist, and a system comparable to the Pan-American precedent, which might be "one of the corner-stones of a stable world organisation."

His panacea for the German menace rests on the fundamental assumption that the directive of German policy since Bismarck has been "not the Chief of State but the German General Staff." Hence the underground resistance and resurrection organisations already being set up under Himmler. Hence, then, the need for a world-organisation backed by power to root out German militarism and prevent its revival. Hence, that is, his detailed plan for the splitting up of Germany into three parts: Rhineland-Baden-Bavaria; Brandenburg-Pomerania-Silesia; and the area from Hanover south to Thuringia. The argument for this demarcation is impressive. So is the list of objections he surveys. He deals with all these objections except one—the objection that *the will to go on perpetuating* that settlement will not outlast the present generation in the Allied countries. But that, at the key-level of psychology, is the one truly fatal objection. He does not meet it.

Nor does the final Section—"World Organisation"—meet those problems which go beyond machinery. Considered as a blueprint it is coherent and wise. Mr. Welles doubts the value of the Big Four as yet organised. He looks to an integrated machine of international government, preceded by a World Council to be set up now at once, and perfected in a World Congress and a World Court, endowed with sufficient material power on a regional and *ad hoc* basis to deal with disorder, and enjoined to respect the rights of the smaller nations. So far so good.

But as yet we lack a blueprint that takes into consideration the vital distinction between machinery and motive—as made for instance in the original Peace Points of the Pope in 1939. Mr. Welles is aware of the appalling difficulty, in one or two passages where he postulates not only machinery but *the will to use it*. It is in this essentially religious field of discussion that the Catholic apologists to-day need all the more to make themselves heard. For none of the other architects are doing it, and the alternative is certain disappointment.

A.C.F.B.

#### A CONTRIBUTION TO CHURCH HISTORY<sup>1</sup>

THE decades between the two World Wars produced much solid and scholarly work in the domain of ecclesiastical history. But no project gave such high promise as a plan of the Paris publishing house, Bloud et Gay, to issue a monumental History of the Church in twenty-four volumes. What progress has been made—or has been possible—since the outbreak of war, I do not know. By September, 1939, four

<sup>1</sup> *The History of the Primitive Church*. Vol. II. By Jules Lebreton, S.J., and Jacques Zeiller. Translated by Ernest C. Messenger. London: Burns, Oates and Washbourne. Pp. 219. Price, 18s. n. 1944.

of the volumes had appeared. The general editors of this big undertaking were Mgr. Victor Martin of the University of Strasbourg and Augustin Fliche. Among the prospective collaborators were scholars like Père Lebreton, S.J., Pierre de Labriolle, Albert de Meyer, G. Constant, Jacques Zeiller, Gustave Bardy, Louis Bréhier and E. Amann.

Two of the volumes have now been translated into English and been published here : the first, two years ago, the second, several weeks back. Our congratulations have been more than earned by Dr. Ernest Messenger whose English version is a model of lucidity and competence and gives a sensitive rendering of the many philosophical and doctrinal expressions of the French original. Our thanks are due to the English publishers, Burns, Oates and Washbourne, for having had the courage and foresight to reserve for this work of scholarship some of their war-time paper. The book is excellently arranged. There are footnotes—not too many, not too few—which provide bibliographies or illuminate technical points ; but they are not so formidable as to alarm or bewilder the ordinary reader, concerned with the main narrative. The text has been carefully set with a gradation of headings and sub-headings. Thus the page is made easy to the eye, and the contents a good deal easier for the mind. Altogether, an admirable piece of work.

This second volume deals with the Church's history in and throughout the second century. As in the first volume, so here too the responsible authors are Père Lebreton and M. Zeiller. Generally speaking, it is Père Lebreton who treats of the life and worship of the Church, its formal teaching, the Apostolic Fathers (Clement, Ignatius and Polycarp), and the Christian apologists, from Justin to Minucius Felix. The more directly historical side is left to M. Zeiller. He considers : the spread of the Faith through the Roman Empire and beyond its confines, into Persia ; the early persecutions and the Imperial legislation with regard to Christians ; the actual persecutions under the Flavian and Antonine Emperors ; the various churches of the second century ; and ecclesiastical organization and Christian Life.

The combination of these two different approaches to Church history is a happy one. For it enables us to see, not only the development of the Church's body—through spread of influence and increase of membership—but also the forming, as it were, of the Church's mind. The analysis of several early documents, such as the letters of Ignatius and the writings of Justin, is helpful. Indeed, the book provides us with more than a history. It gives us at the same time an historical apologetic, all the more cogent because it is not put into a strictly apologetic form.

We hope that this historical series has been worked at during the war in France, and we hope equally that the English publishers will continue to have the volumes translated. If subsequent parts are up to the high standard of these first two—and there is no reason for thinking they will not be—then we shall have an excellent History of the Church, of interest and value, alike to the scholar and the reading Catholic.

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## SHORT NOTICES

### OTHER PUBLICATIONS

**The Thinker's Digest**, issued from College Misericordia, at Dallas, Pennsylvania, U.S.A., is a quarterly publication, containing extracts from Catholics books and periodicals. In the two numbers we have

received may be found passages from Fathers Steuart and D'Arcy, S.J., from MM. Gilson and Maritain, and from Mr. Arnold Lunn—to say nothing of classical authors like SS. Teresa and John of the Cross. Two extracts are taken from the MONTH: the first, from Father Steuart on "The Mystical Body" (July-August, 1943), the second, from Mr. Lunn's "Flight from Beauty" (November-December, 1943). This Digest is admirably produced—on a creamy paper that awakens memories of pre-1939.

In *Scouting, Religion and the Churches* (Boy Scouts Association: 6d. n.) we have a useful statement of the problem of religion and religious services, as it is faced in the Scouts. The Catholic position is clearly and unambiguously set forth in a statement of Cardinal Bourne at the time of the Arrowe Park Jamboree. Most of the handbook has no direct reference to Catholics scouts, and this is noted by the author who states that "the needs of the Church of England, of Free Church and non-Church groups are mainly considered." Baden-Powell's own attitude is emphasized, namely that Scouting aims at providing a foundation on which all who believe in God can build in the development and practice of their Faith; that it realises this end by "rousing the sense of wonder, and by developing the habit of service to others"; finally, that Scouting is not exclusively Christian. The Scout movement has done so much good that criticism here seems ungenerous but it remains always necessary to remind Catholic scouts that mixed or joint services are forbidden, and that they will best live up to their scout ideals if they adhere firmly to their Catholic faith and practice, and have no hesitation in letting their fellow scouts know that this is their position.

From M. H. Gill & Son, Dublin (6d. n.), come a series of letters, exchanged between a priest uncle and a young niece, entitled *Just Seventeen*. The letters provide a good outline of the Catholic attitude to life, as young people need to have it put to them. Uncle is heavy-handed at times, but Joan, the niece, is dutiful and takes it all extremely well. A useful pamphlet.

In *the Beginning was the Word* (R. D. Dickinson & Co.: 6d. n.), is a reprint of an article of Donald Attwater, which appeared in the *Dublin Review*. The article was a plea for the wider use of English in liturgical worship and it has occasioned interesting controversy. The whole question has been ventilated in the correspondence columns of the *Catholic Herald*, and has provoked a reply in the October, 1944 issue of the *Dublin Review*.

Among useful publications of the Catholic Truth Society (3d. n.) the following should be noticed: *Rome and the Eastern Churches*, an English version of the Encyclical, *Orientalis Ecclesiae Decus*, issued by the Holy Father on the occasion of the fifteenth centenary of the death of St. Cyril of Alexandria. Under the title of *Stand By The Bible* we have another translation—this time of the Papal document, *Divino Afflante Spiritu*, intended to stimulate the study of Holy Scripture. Both versions have been made—and lucidly made—by Canon G. D. Smith. An article by Canon Smith, which first appeared in the *Clergy Review*, is republished in the C.T.S. Students' Series as *Some Reflections on the Encyclical Mystical Corporis Christi*.

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